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INTRODUCTION 
Fairness is a foundational concept in American jurisprudence.1 Yet when 
evaluating our system of civil procedure, debate surrounds how to reconcile the 
competing ends of our civil justice system.2 While scholars agree that our civil 
justice system must vindicate rights,3 deter wrongful conduct,4 respect human 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law. For their gener-
ous insights and feedback, I thank participants of Indiana University’s Social Psychology 
Seminar Series (Jan. 2014); the Social Psychology & Law Pre-Conference and the annual 
meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) (Jan. 2014), the inau-
gural meeting of Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field (Feb. 2014); the Universi-
ty of Illinois College of Law’s Junior Faculty Exchange (Apr. 2014), the A2J Empirical 
Methods Workshop (Apr. 2014), and the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association 
(LSA) (May 2014). In particular, I thank Tom Tyler, Donna Shestowsky, Rich Wiener, Jen-
nifer Robbennolt, Kenworthey Bilz, Arden Rowell, Tonya Brito, Amanda Ward, KT Albis-
ton, Becky Sandefur, Anna Carpenter, Alyx Mark, Colleen Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg, Jim 
Sherman, Joe Hoffmann, Jeffrey Stake, Jason DuMont, Laura Foster, Alberto Varon, and 
Mary Murphy for their insight and encouragement. Last, this research would not be possible 
without the insights early on shared by members of the Indiana University Mind & Identity 
in Context Lab and the members of my own Law & Social Psychology Lab, thanked, infra 
note 22. Errors of thought and expression are solely my own. 
1  See ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2–3 (1979); 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977) (“The gravitational force of a 
precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the 
fairness of treating like cases alike.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (“By and large it seems clear that the fairness and effec-
tiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions.”); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any 
Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178 (1955); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. 
REV. 164, 164 (1958), reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80 (Frederick A. Olafson 
ed., 1961) [hereinafter Rawls, Justice as Fairness]; John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the 
Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 9–10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) [hereinafter 
Rawls, Legal Obligation]. 
2  William James vividly discussed the problem of reconciling different ends and purposes in 
one of his finest works, Pragmatism. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR 
SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 99 (2010) (“Our different purposes also are at war with each 
other. Where one can’t crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is again different 
from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand. . . . Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleo-
logical unity, saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves, 
dogmatizes at his own risk.”). 
3  See e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 113–18 (2011); Michael J. 
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And 
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1217–25 (1992); see also RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, 
Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
preme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 
DUKE L.J. 1153, 1202 (1974). 
4  See e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1879); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 176–77 (1968); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: 
The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001); Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010). 
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dignity,5 and enhance social welfare and efficiency,6 scholars disagree on how 
best to reconcile these ends.7 Doubtless, the tension between these plural ends 
poses difficulty when courts, civil rule designers, and legislators balance and 
weigh the costs and benefits of different civil procedural rules and constitution-
al safeguards under the Due Process Clause. Notably, courts face this vexing 
difficulty when conducting the cost-benefit analysis envisioned by Mathews v. 
Eldridge under the Due Process Clause,8 and upon amendment of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts will face this difficulty under newly 
amended Rule 1.9 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court enacted, under the Due Process 
Clause, a cost-benefit analysis that courts conduct when a claimant challenges 
as insufficient the procedural safeguards in place when a state actor revokes 
life, liberty, property, or vital public benefits,10 including social security bene-
fits, unemployment compensation, aid to dependent children, veteran benefits, 
                                                        
5  See e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–50 (1976); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1177; see also COVER & FISS, 
supra note 1, at 2. 
6  See e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 114 n.72 
(2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Pos-
ner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 399, 399 (1973). 
7  Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) 
(“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution . . . is to min-
imize the risk of erroneous decisions.”), with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 34 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (“Finally, apart from avoiding the risk of actual error, this Court has stressed the 
importance of adopting procedures that preserve the appearance of fairness . . . .”), and Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). See generally COVER & FISS, supra note 1, at 
2; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION 215 (1993) (“The fundamental problem for American civil justice is to ac-
commodate these ideals—equality, access, autonomy, and openness in civil justice—to the 
reality that their fulfillment entails economic, political, and moral costs.”); Stephen B. Bur-
bank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United 
States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 
98 YALE L.J. 945, 947–55 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH 
RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1213; Alan B. Morrison, The Ne-
cessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 
993–97 (2012); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 844–59 (1984). 
8  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
9  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure proposed an 
amendment to Rule 1, which was approved by the Judicial Conference on September 14, 
2014. The amendment was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court on April 1, 2015. Absent 
congressional action, the new rule will take effect on December 1, 2015. See Memorandum 
from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (June  
14, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports 
/ST09-2014-add.pdf; Letter of Transmittal from Chief Justice John G. Roberts on Fed. Rules 
of Civil Procedure to Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (April 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments. 
10  See Mashaw, supra note 5, at 39–57. 
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and state and local welfare.11 In so doing, the Mathews Court called upon 
courts to weigh the cost of providing additional procedural safeguards against 
the benefit gained, with benefit narrowly defined as the degree to which addi-
tional procedures enhance the accuracy of the determination at stake.12 Since its 
inception, this form of cost-benefit analysis has been challenged for failing to 
encompass the full plurality, diversity, and range of human values implicated 
when procedural justice is withheld, including the degree to which procedural 
injustice diminishes human dignity.13 In this regard, the Mathews Court’s nar-
row conception of cost and benefit is now in marked tension with the form of 
cost-benefit analysis that even federal agencies conduct, which broadly consid-
ers values difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 
and fairness.14 The chasm between the cramped analysis conducted by courts 
under the Due Process Clause, and the more capacious analysis conducted by 
federal agencies is both deeply troubling and ironic—for the Due Process 
Clause, properly understood,15 is inherently about procedural justice, fairness, 
and furnishing individuals human dignity.16 This chasm raises the question of 
whether the Mathews v. Eldridge conception of cost-benefit analysis under the 
                                                        
11  See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783 (1964): 
Because it is so hard to confine relevance and discretion, procedure offers a valuable 
means for restraining arbitrary action. This was recognized in the strong procedural emphasis of 
the Bill of Rights, and it is being recognized in the increasingly procedural emphasis of adminis-
trative law. The law of government largess has developed with little regard for procedure. Re-
versal of this trend is long overdue. 
The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government largess should 
be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures. Action should be open to hearing and 
contest, and based upon a record subject to judicial review. The denial of any form of privilege 
or benefit on the basis of undisclosed reasons should no longer be tolerated. 
Id. 
12  See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343. 
13  See infra Part III.A. 
14  See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1380 (2014); Rachel 
Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732, 
1735–41 (2014). Indeed, federal agencies have recently been encouraged and empowered to 
harness the behavioral sciences in considering how the American public experiences pro-
grams when formulating policies. See Using Behavioral Sciences to Better Serve the Ameri-
can People, Exec. Order No. 13,70_, 80 Fed. Reg. __ (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“To more fully 
realize the benefits of behavioral insights and deliver better results at a lower cost for the 
American people, the Federal Government should design its policies and programs to reflect 
our best understanding of how people engage with, participate in, use, and respond to these 
policies and programs.”). 
15  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945); Mashaw, supra note 5, at 51; Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller’s Juris-
prudence and America’s Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 438 (1978). 
16  See COVER & FISS, supra note 1, at 2; DWORKIN, supra note 1 (“The gravitational force of 
a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to 
the fairness of treating like cases alike.”); Fuller, supra note 1 (“By and large it seems clear 
that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions.”); 
Hart, supra note 1, at 185; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 1; Rawls, Legal Obliga-
tion, supra note 1; Resnik, supra note 7, at 847. 
886 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:882  
Due Process Clause is consistent with how the public experiences tradeoffs be-
tween procedural justice and cost. Does the public, for example, treat procedur-
al justice as an ordinary monetizable consumer preference, or does the public 
experience procedural justice as a deeply human, sacred, moral, and dignitary 
value? 
Further, these plural ends are forged into Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which serves as the interpretive lens for all other rules of fed-
eral civil procedure.17 Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action and proceeding.”18 Doubtless, these ends are 
in tension. Fair procedures entail cost. Fair procedures cause delay.19 These 
procedural tradeoffs underlie much of the tension, indeterminacy, and flexibil-
ity within our civil justice system, and this tension has engendered considera-
ble—and at times spirited—debate. Until recently, Rule 1 was merely an inter-
pretive guide for courts. The Supreme Court, however, has recently approved 
newly amended Rule 1, which now affirmatively requires parties to weigh and 
strike these procedural tradeoffs. Newly amended Rule 1 states that the rules 
“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceed.”20 Soon therefore, claimants, defendants, and courts may face many of 
the vexing challenges posed by Mathews v. Eldridge under newly amended 
Rule 1. Yet, a crucial threshold question remains: how do members of the pub-
lic experience these tradeoffs; how would members of the public, for example, 
experience tradeoffs between procedural fairness and cost? 
Consistent with the themes of the inaugural Conference on Psychology and 
Lawyering,21 we22 draw on psychological science and harness psychological 
experiments to investigate these questions. First, we examine whether the pub-
lic is willing to pay to upgrade from procedural unfairness to procedural fair-
ness. Relatedly, we examine the public’s maximum willingness to pay to en-
                                                        
17  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FED. R. EVID. 102 (“[R]ules should be construed so as to 
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote 
the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just de-
termination.”). 
18  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
19  See Morrison, supra note 7, at 994. 
20  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added); Memorandum, supra note 9. 
21  The inaugural Conference on Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field was held 
at the UNLV Boyd School of Law, Las Vegas, Nevada, on February 21–22, 2014. 
22  This project reflects the efforts of a village. First and foremost, I thank the tireless efforts 
of my IU Law & Social Psychology Lab, and the lab members who helped to complete this 
project: Michael Yontz, Sarah Kupferberg, Holly Heerdink, Annie Milkey, Taylor Ballinger, 
and Samantha von Ende. Second, I thank the IU Statistical Consulting Center, and the efforts 
of Thomas Arthur Jackson, Stephanie Dickinson, and Wesley Beauli. Third, I thank the in-
sights shared by members of the IU Social Psychology Seminar Series. Last, this research 
would not be possible without insights early on shared by the Mind & Identity in Context 
Lab at Indiana University. 
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hance procedural fairness.23 Next, we examine whether the public is willing to 
accept payments to downgrade from fair process to unfair process.24 Stated an-
other way, is the public willing to monetize and exchange the procedural justice 
afforded to them? Thus, we examine the public’s minimum willingness to ac-
cept the descent from procedural justice to procedural injustice.25 Last, we ex-
amine whether these willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) and willingness-to-accept 
(“WTA”) values vary with the underlying interests at stake.26 In this way, and 
joining in the collective efforts of those who seek to coalesce the field of psy-
chology and lawyering, we illustrate how Law & Psychological Science,27 a 
form of naturalized legal inquiry28 and behavioral realism,29 that examines legal 
problems by infusing law with insights from the psychological and behavioral 
sciences, can be harnessed in the realm of civil procedure and dispute system 
design30 to cast new light on vexing problems to benefit courts, procedural reg-
ulators, and legal professionals. 
                                                        
23  See infra Part II. 
24  See infra Part II. 
25  See infra Part II. 
26  See infra Part II. 
27  Law & Psychological Science is an interdisciplinary method that melds empirical legal 
inquiry and psychological science. See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. Quintanilla, Access to 
Counsel: Psychological Science Can Improve the Promise of Civil Rights Enforcement, 1 
POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 95, 102 (2014); Victor D. Quintanilla, Judicial 
Mindsets: The Social Psychology of Implicit Theories and the Law, 90 NEB. L. REV. 611 
(2011). Law & Psychological Science draws inspiration from several neighboring jurispru-
dential projects, including: Behavioral Realism; see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 27, Situa-
tionism; see generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 129 (2003); Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1345 (2008) and New Legal Realism; see generally Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth 
Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010). 
28  See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2007) (“Naturalism is a familiar development in 
recent philosophy: indeed, it would not be wrong to say that it is the distinctive development 
in philosophy over the last thirty years.”). 
29  Behavioral Realism is a far-reaching means of inquiry, which bears an impulse of natural-
ism, one that explores gaps between a scientific consensus and untested folk wisdom incor-
porated and subsumed into law. The scientific consensus may arise in a variety of social sci-
ence disciplines, including evolutionary biology, behavioral genetics, and psychology. 
“Behavioral realism” emerged from a symposium in July 2006 discussing how advances in 
social and cognitive sciences offer new jurisprudential perspectives. See generally Jerry 
Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 465, 490 (2010). After the symposium, jurists and social psychologists produced 
several noteworthy works. See generally EUGENE BORGIDA & SUSAN T. FISKE, BEYOND 
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (2008); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit 
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006). 
30  For examples from the vibrant and growing field of dispute system design, see CATHY A. 
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 19 (1996); 
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Procedural justice measures subjective perceptions about and experiences 
with the fairness and legitimacy of procedures.31 This research demonstrates 
that the public cares deeply about the fairness of the process by which decisions 
are made, independent from considerations about substantive outcomes.32 
While the harvest of procedural justice research is truly vast, this research has 
yet to interconnect with a second body of psychological research on taboo 
tradeoffs. Philip Tetlock, Jonathan Baron, and colleagues have investigated ta-
boo tradeoffs and the problem of constitutive incommensurability.33 These so-
cial psychologists have examined how sacred and protected values affect deci-
sionmaking and result in taboo tradeoffs.34 Mainly, when members of the 
public are presented with proposed exchanges between sacred values—such as 
loved ones, God, justice, human beings—and money, the public experiences 
sharp cognitive, affective, and behavioral resistance.35 The public has marked 
difficulty commodifying these sacred values into market-price terms. While 
people may be willing to pay to protect these sacred values, the public sharply 
resists commodifying, monetizing, and selling sacred values. In this article, we 
                                                                                                                                
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Man-
aging Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2008); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145 (2004); Jennifer F. 
Lynch, Beyond ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management, 17 NEGOTIATION J. 207 
(2001); Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Manag-
ing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53 (2008); Mary Rowe, Organizational Sys-
tems for Dealing with and Learning from Conflict: Introduction, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
233 (2009). 
31  See infra Part I.A; see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 65 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Pro-
cedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 65–68 (Joseph Sanders & 
V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). 
32  See infra Part I.A; see also LIND, & TYLER, supra note 31; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138–46 
(2011); Tyler & Lind, supra note 31. 
33  See infra Part II.B; see also Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: 
Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 853–70 (2000). 
34  See infra Part II.B; see also Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitiv-
ity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Con-
straints, Availability, and Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 107 (1996); Alan Page 
Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the 
Spheres of Justice, 18 J. INT’L SOC’Y POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 273–85 (1997); A. Peter McGraw 
et al., The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value of Things, 30 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 219, 219–21 (2003); A. Peter McGraw & Philip Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs, 
Relational Framing, and the Acceptability of Exchanges, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 2, 2–15 
(2005); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Protected Values and Omission Bias, 79 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79, 79–82 (1999); Tetlock et al., su-
pra note 33, at 853–56. 
35  See, e.g., Rumen Iliev et al., Attending to Moral Values, in MORAL JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 170, 170–78 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009); Jonathan Baron & 
Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
1, 1–4 (1997); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 256; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 863–
65. 
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connect these two bodies of research and investigate whether psychological 
science on taboo tradeoffs casts new light on how the public experiences 
tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost. 
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows: in part I, the article 
offers a theoretical orientation, presenting social-psychological research on 
procedural justice, taboo tradeoffs, relational theory, and the sacred-value pro-
tection model. In part II, the article reports an experiment conducted with 
members of the American public, discussing first methods then results. In part 
III, the article presents a general discussion regarding the implications of this 
research on procedural regulation, including implications for the cost-benefit 
analysis envisioned by Mathews v. Eldridge36 under the Due Process Clause 
and concerns raised under newly amended Rule 1, and turns then to civil pro-
cedure pedagogy. Last, the article closes with next steps for this line of research 
and conclusions. 
I. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, TABOO TRADEOFFS, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIVE INCOMMENSURABILITY 
A. Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice research measures the extent to which the public experi-
ences legal procedures and dispute resolution as fair and legitimate. This re-
search investigates both the formal features of procedural rules and the manner 
in which decisionmakers treat disputants.37 Over the past several decades, re-
searchers have harvested empirical findings which demonstrate that procedural 
justice powerfully shapes the degree to which the public deems legal authorities 
legitimate and affects the public’s acceptance and adherence to legal decisions. 
Procedural justice researchers have demonstrated that experiences with proce-
dural justice influence the public’s satisfaction with how disputes are handled.38 
Researchers have, moreover, consistently shown that procedural justice influ-
ences the public’s impressions of fairness as strongly, if not more so, than sub-
stantive outcomes themselves.39 While distributive justice matters greatly, so 
too does the fairness by which decisions are made.40 In brief, fair process and 
                                                        
36  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
37  LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 66–67; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75–86; see, e.g., 
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, 1–
2 (1975). 
38  Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75–86; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Mod-
el of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 121 (1992). 
39  Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fair-
ness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (1988); see also Lawrence B. 
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). 
40  Id. 
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fair treatment matter independent of and apart from the favorability of out-
comes.41 
Procedural justice is a multifaceted42 social-psychological construct. That 
is, several dimensions of the process of arriving at and announcing a decision, 
as well as how the public is treated, combine to shape the public’s experiences 
of procedural justice. Researchers have empirically revealed that experiences of 
procedural justice are affected by several criteria, including: whether the public 
is afforded a voice and heard, whether the public is granted a neutral and trust-
worthy decisionmaker, and whether the public is treated with dignity and re-
spect.43 Put another way, the public cares deeply about the degree to which a 
decisionmaker is ethical and honest and the extent to which that decisionmaker 
behaves fairly and impartially.44 These features combine to form a positively 
interrelated cluster of procedural criteria,45 which, from the public’s perspec-
tive, should be simultaneously promoted. The criteria rarely operate inde-
                                                        
41  LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 67; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 70, 75. See, e.g., 
THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 37, at 3. 
42  Tyler, supra note 39, at 128. 
43  TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 52 (2002); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-
Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 747–48 (2003); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 
32, at 140–41; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75. Tyler, supra note 39, at 104–05; Tyler & 
Lind, supra note 38, at 122. These dimensions of procedural justice have a long and hal-
lowed lineage in human experience and can be traced back to the dawn of Western civiliza-
tion, in the Axial period. For example, Aeschylus, the Greek poet born around year 525 B.C., 
in Eumenides, at 360–88, narrates a discussion between Goddess Athena and the Chorus of 
Furies, in which the Furies aim to deprive Orestes of voice at his trial before the judges of 
Delphi. To which, Athena sharply replies: 
Athena: Ye would seem just, yet work iniquity. 
Furies: How? Tell me that! Thou art not poor in wisdom. 
Athena: Wrong shall not triumph here by force of oaths. 
Furies: Question him then and give a righteous judgment.  
. . . . 
Athena: Sir, what hast thou to answer touching this? 
Tell me thy land, thy lineage and all 
Thy griefs; and then speak in thine own defence, 
If that thou look’st for judgment; for that cause 
Harbourest at my hearth; all rites performed, 
A grave appellant, like Ixion old. 
Come, to all this make me your clear reply. 
Aeschylus, THE ORESTEIA 85–86, 227–79 (Penguin ed., 1984) (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Euripides, the Greek poet born around year 480 BC, in Hippolytus, narrates a tragic se-
quence after King Theseus rashly asks Poseidon to curse death on his beloved son Hippoly-
tus without first offering Hippolytus procedural justice to defend himself against false charg-
es, to which Goddess Artemis warns, “But thou alike in [Poseidon’s] eyes and in mine hast 
shewn thy evil heart, in that thou hast forestalled all proof or voice prophetic, hast made no 
inquiry, nor taken time for consideration, but with undue haste cursed thy son even to the 
death.” EURIPIDES, THE PLAYS OF EURIPIDES: VOLUME II 110 (Edward P. Coleridge trans. 
1891) (emphasis added). 
44  Tyler, supra note 39, at 121, 123. 
45  Id. at 131. 
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pendently and instead holistically combine to constitute experiences of proce-
dural justice.46 
Researchers have examined the downstream consequences of enhancing or 
depriving procedural justice in legal and business environments. In legal envi-
ronments, enhancing procedural justice promotes the public’s acceptance of le-
gal decisions.47 Tom Tyler and colleagues, for example, have shown that the 
extent to which the public experiences procedural justice shapes the public’s 
adherence to law.48 In criminal proceedings, elevating procedural justice de-
creases recidivism.49 
In business environments, imparting procedural justice promotes pro-social 
and cooperative workplace behavior.50 Procedural justice, moreover, affects 
commitment to organizations and institutions and diminishes workplace strife 
and conflict.51 Fair process enhances commitment to organizations and institu-
                                                        
46  Id. at 128. 
47  See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990); Denise C. Gottfredson et 
al., How Drug Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 3, 3 (2007); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law?: Legit-
imacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 (2012); 
E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fair-
ness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 245 (1993); Jason Sunshine & Tom 
Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Polic-
ing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 535 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Le-
gitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and 
Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 79 (2014). 
48  Tyler, supra note 38, at 130. 
49  See Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The In-
fluence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419, 419 
(2011); Jackson et al., supra note 47; Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals 
Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 435 (2012); Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Pro-
cedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
163, 186 (1997); Elizabeth A. Stanko et al., A Golden Thread, a Presence Amongst Uni-
forms, and a Good Deal of Data: Studying Public Confidence in the London Metropolitan 
Police 1, 4 (Apr. 20, 2011) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815824; Tom R. Tyler et 
al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim 
Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 369–71 (2010). 
50  See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 10 (2000); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 108 (2011); Steven L. Blader et al., Proce-
dural Justice and Retaliation in Organizations: Comparing Cross-Nationally the Importance 
of Fair Group Processes, 12 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 295, 305–06 (2001); David De 
Cremer & Daan van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The Effects of 
Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858, 859 (2002); David De 
Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fairness on Co-
operation, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 639, 648 (2007); Tom R. Tyler & David De Cremer, 
Process-Based Leadership: Fair Procedures and Reactions to Organizational Change, 16 
LEADERSHIP Q. 529, 531 (2005). 
51  TYLER & BLADER, supra note 50; David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing Group 
Behavior: The Interplay Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self, and Cooperation, 37 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 191 (2005); David De Cremer et al., Manag-
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tions, promotes extra-role citizenship behavior, elevates job performance, in-
creases levels of job satisfaction, and promotes acceptance of supervisor direc-
tives and company policies.52 When procedural justice is withheld, employees 
often exit the workplace or refuse to cooperate with supervisors, and workplace 
morale falls.53 Within procedurally unjust workplaces, employees exhibit 
workplace stress and may engage in antisocial behavior. Taken together, this 
research demonstrates that procedural justice powerfully affects the psychology 
of how individuals think, feel, and behave in particular contexts and the dynam-
ics of how groups, organizations, and societies interact. 
Of marked significance, this psychological science reveals that procedural 
justice is an important means of buttressing democratic norms and promoting 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Experiences of procedural justice 
shape the extent to which the public accepts law, legal decisions, and rules; and 
the extent to which the public perceives legal authorities—including judges, 
mediators, and courts—as legitimate.54 This wellspring of legitimacy shapes 
the public’s willingness to obey legal rules and judicial decrees.55 Procedural 
justice, hence, affords an avenue to both promote voluntary compliance with 
law and encourage pro-social, civic, and democratic behavior.56 Insofar as pro-
cedural justice is so closely interwoven with human dignity, procedural justice 
is both an end in itself and a vital means to promote the legitimacy of our civil 
justice system. 
B. Taboo Tradeoffs and the Problem of Constitutive Incommensurability 
The article now turns to the phenomenon of taboo tradeoffs and the related 
problem of constitutive incommensurability. These psychological phenomena 
will be contrasted against the theory of unbounded decisionmaking, which the-
                                                                                                                                
ing Cooperation via Procedural Fairness: The Mediating Influence of Self-other Merging, 
26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 393, 401–02 (2005); David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, supra note 
50, at 640. 
52  See Virginia Murphy-Berman et al., Fairness and Health Care Decision Making: Testing 
the Group Value Model of Procedural Justice, 12 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 117 (1999); Kristina 
Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role 
of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 661 (2008). 
53  Laurie J. Barclay et al., Exploring the Role of Emotions in Injustice Perceptions and Re-
taliation, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (2005); Ana Belén del Río-Lanza et al., Satisfac-
tion with Service Recovery: Perceived Justice and Emotional Responses, 62 J. BUS. RES. 
775, 776 (2009); David De Cremer, Unfair Treatment and Revenge Taking: The Roles of 
Collective Identification and Feelings of Disappointment, 10 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY 
RES. & PRAC. 220, 220 (2006). 
54  Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective 
When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 17 (2009); 
Tom R Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 375, 379–80 (2006). 
55  Tyler, supra note 54, at 379. 
56  LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 64; Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural 
Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 642–
45 (2014). 
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orizes that all competing values can be rendered commensurable and traded off 
against each other. Chiefly, unbounded accounts of economic decisionmaking 
theorize that people are indifferent to tradeoffs between competing values, so 
long as any tradeoff yields the same amount of expected utility. 
This classical account of unbounded decisionmaking depicts people as ra-
tional actors whose overriding aim is to increase their expected utility by select-
ing among utility-maximizing options from available choice sets.57 Under this 
account, when people make decisions, they explicitly weigh and trade conflict-
ing values against one another. Classically, indifference curves are used to 
model and depict these tradeoffs. These indifference curves connect combina-
tions of two different values, graphing points of equal utility and desirability 
for two values along a smooth convex curve. Graphically, indifference curves 
depict that for any two values, a change in the satisfaction of one value can be 
compensated for by a change in the second value.58 Indifference reasoning is 
taken as a prerequisite for unbounded economic rationality. That is, people are 
theorized to first reduce and then explicitly weigh all conflicting preferences 
and values according to a common utility metric.59 
Over the past several decades, this classical depiction of unbounded deci-
sionmaking has been revealed as incomplete by behavioral economists and re-
searchers of social cognition.60 Instead, humans are “boundedly rational;”61 
people have both difficulty with and resistance to translating all values into a 
common utility metric.62 This difficulty is partially explained by the phenome-
                                                        
57  See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 3 (3d 
ed. 1972); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 263–64 (1979). 
58  Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 196–97 (1991). 
59  See Jonathan Baron, Tradeoffs Among Reasons for Action, 16 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 
173, 181 (1986); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 292; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 
219; see also Robin S. Gregory, Incorporating Value Trade-offs into Community-Based En-
vironmental Risk Decisions, 11 ENVTL. VALUES 461, 464–67 (2002). 
60  Alan P. Fiske & Nick Haslam, Social Cognition Is Thinking About Relationships, 5 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 143, 143 (1996); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on 
Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 702–03 
(2003); Daniel J. Keys & Barry Schwartz, “Leaky” Rationality: How Research on Behav-
ioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality, 2 PERSP. PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 162, 162 (2007); Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske, Moral Psychology Is Relationship 
Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality, 118 
PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 57 (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Deci-
sions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
61  See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 
(1955); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Ap-
proach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553 (1981). 
62  See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Chal-
lenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 751–65 (2011); Tetlock et al., su-
pra note 33, at 854. 
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non of cognitive incommensurability.63 Mainly, people find it taxing and cogni-
tively difficult to compare and contrast options across different metrics and di-
mensions, especially when they have neither personal experience nor cultural 
standards to guide their judgment.64 
Moreover, psychological science on moral decisionmaking has cast light 
on how the public strikes difficult tradeoffs. For example, classical accounts of 
unbounded rationality often either neglected or obscured the influence of ideo-
logies, religious beliefs, moral values, and ethical positions on decisionmaking. 
Over the past several decades, however, research on moral judgment and mor-
ally motivated decisionmaking has begun to illuminate these processes.65 
Two lines of research within the field of moral psychology have examined 
the phenomenon of taboo tradeoffs. First, Tetlock and colleagues have studied 
how sacred values affect decisionmaking.66 These researchers define a sacred 
value as a “value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as pos-
sessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, 
tradeoffs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values.”67 In 
the second line of research, Baron and colleagues have researched the effect of 
protected values on decisionmaking, which they define as values “that resist 
trade-offs with other values, particularly with economic values.”68 These exper-
imental psychologists study forbidden tradeoffs by presenting members of the 
                                                        
63  See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 62–63 
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
795–76 (1994); see also John W. Patty, Incommensurability and Issue Voting, 19 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 115, 117 (2007); Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incom-
mensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1134–37 (2003); Arden Rowell, Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 723, 732 (2012) (arguing that commensurability should not be confused with mone-
tizability). 
64  See Martin Hanselmann & Carmen Tanner, Taboos and Conflicts in Decision Making: 
Sacred Values, Decision Difficulty, and Emotions, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 51, 58 
(2008); Mary Frances Luce et al., Emotional Trade-Off Difficulty and Choice, 36 J. 
MARKETING RES. 143, 143–47 (1999); McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 220–21; Patty, supra 
note 63. 
65  See generally SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL RULES: ON THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
MORAL JUDGMENT 4 (2004); JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 
(2007); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral 
Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1082 (2006); Joshua 
Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 517–23 (2002). 
66  See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 221; 
McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 4; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
67  See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853. 
68  See Iliev et al., supra note 35, at 171; Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of 
Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget 
Constraints, Availability, and Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 107, 107 
(1996); Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normali-
ty, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74–78 (2004); Baron & 
Spranca, supra note 35, at 1; Ritov & Baron, supra note 34, at 79. 
Spring 2015] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TRADEOFFS 895 
public with decisions that involve trading sacred/protected values for money. 
When presented with these taboo tradeoffs, people experience sharp cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral responses, including moral outrage.69 
Research by Tetlock, Baron, and colleagues has demonstrated that taboo 
tradeoffs, and the public’s marked resistance to translating all values into a 
common utility metric, can be explained by the problem of constitutive incom-
mensurability.70 A range of disciplines—including moral psychology, moral 
philosophy, and sociology71—have grappled with the problem of constitutive 
incommensurability. Constitutive incommensurability signifies that people 
compartmentalize the kinds of tradeoffs that are considered legitimate. People, 
for example, experience tradeoffs between goods and commodities that our so-
ciety routinely subjects to market pricing as legitimate. In contrast, people ex-
perience other ends and values, such as loved ones, humanity, God, and justice, 
as infinitely valuable and sacred, and hence the latter are not experienced as 
fungible or commodifiable. Scholars working across disciplines have collected 
illustrative taxonomies and frameworks for understanding blocked exchanges 
(quintessential taboo tradeoffs), instances in which it is considered immoral to 
monetize and sell. These blocked exchanges span to human beings, divine 
grace, marriage, love, friendship, and sacred freedoms—including our free-
doms of speech, assembly, and religion.72 
Taboo tradeoffs emerge because we exist within a social and cultural envi-
ronment that instills members with shared beliefs, values, norms, and commit-
                                                        
69  See Iliev et al., supra note 35, at 170–71; Craig MacMillan & Colin Wastell, Taboo 
Trade-offs, Moral Outrage and the Moral Limits of Markets, 2 MACQUARIE ECON. RES. 
PAPERS 4 (2008). 
70  See Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values, 
6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 183, 183 (2000); Gregory, supra note 59, at 466–67; 
Hanselmann & Tanner, supra note 64, at 58–59; Keys & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 163–
65; Patty, supra note 63, at 118; see also Sunstein, supra note 63, at 795–812. 
71  See Alan Page Fiske, Relativity Within Moose (“Mossi”) Culture: Four Incommensurable 
Models for Social Relationships, 18 ETHOS 180, 194 (1990); MacMillan & Wastell, supra 
note 69; Rai & Fiske, supra note 60; Nicola Righetti, The Sacred in Current Social Sciences 
Research, 4 ITALIAN SOC. REV. 133, 145 (2014); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853–56; see 
also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325, 325 n.1 (1986). 
72  See Judith Andre, Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy, 103 ETHICS 29–47 (1992); see also 
Philip E. Tetlock et al., Proscribed Forms of Social Cognition: Taboo Trade-offs, Blocked 
Exchanges, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, in RELATIONAL MODELS 
THEORY: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW 247, 247–61 (Nick Haslam ed., 2004); MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100–01 (1983). 
[T]he initial agreement on the principle of equal liberty is final. An individual recognizing reli-
gious and moral obligations regards them as binding absolutely in the sense that he cannot quali-
fy his fulfillment of them for the sake of greater means for promoting his other interests. Greater 
economic and social benefits are not a sufficient reason for accepting less than an equal liberty. 
It seems possible to consent to an unequal liberty only if there is a threat of coercion. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (1971) 
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ments.73 These shared beliefs, values, norms, and commitments require that 
members of society deny comparison and commodification of certain con-
cepts.74 Members of society are socialized to reject tradeoffs between things of 
finite monetary value with ends and values that our society deems of transcen-
dental and infinite significance.75 Striking a taboo tradeoff, such as by attaching 
monetary value when, say, selling one’s child, is to disqualify oneself from so-
ciety.76 In sum, a taboo tradeoff exists when monetizing subverts an end or val-
ue that society deems infinitely meaningful. This forbidden tradeoff is itself ex-
perienced as morally corrosive, or taboo.77 
                                                        
73  See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets, 126 
Q.J. ECON. 805, 807–08 (2011); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 854–55; Tetlock et al., supra 
note 72. Emile Durkheim reasoned about similar societal phenomena: 
There can be no society, which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular in-
tervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. 
. . . Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, 
and meetings where the individuals being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common 
their common sentiments. 
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 427 (Karen E. Fields trans., 
1995). 
74  See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 73, at 811; Luce et al., supra note 64, at 143–47. 
75  See Baron, supra note 59, at 182; Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 3; Hanselmann & 
Tanner, supra note 64, at 52; Sarah Lichtenstein et al., What’s Bad Is Easy: Taboo Values, 
Affect, and Cognition, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 169, 170 (2007); MacMillan & 
Wastell, supra note 69, at 3–4; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 4; Tetlock et al., supra 
note 33, at 854. 
76  See Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: Intui-
tive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 451, 459 (2002); Tetlock 
et al., supra note 33, at 854; see also RAZ, supra note 71, at 346 (“For such parents, having 
children and having money cannot be compared in value. Moreover, they will be indignant at 
the suggestion that such a comparison is possible. Finally, they will refuse to contemplate 
even the possibility of such an exchange.”). 
77  See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 73, at 812; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–91; 
McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 221; Rai & Fiske, supra note 60, at 66; Tetlock et al., supra 
note 33, at 867. Though psychological research on taboo tradeoffs had been conducted in the 
last several decades, humans have experienced and written about such conundrums since the 
days of Greek antiquity. For example, in the Phoenician Maidens, Euripides accentuates the 
plot by drawing both on taboo tradeoffs and tragic tradeoffs. EURIPIDES, THE PLAYS OF 
EURIPIDES: VOLUME I, at 235, 248 (Edward P. Coleridge trans., 1891). There, Jocasta, mother 
to her dueling regal sons, Polynices and Eteocles, who battle for the throne of Thebes, puts 
to Eteocles a taboo tradeoff: “Riches make no settled home, but are as transient as the day. 
Come, suppose I put before thee two alternatives, whether thou wilt rule or save thy city? 
Wilt thou say ‘Rule’? . . . thou wilt see this city conquered . . . so will that wealth thou art so 
bent on getting become a grievous bane to Thebes; but still ambition fills thee.” Id. at 235. 
Eteocles who chooses unwisely perishes, teaching the immorality of his choice. Later in the 
play, Teiresias, the seer, puts to Creon a tragic tradeoff, “Choose thee one of these alterna-
tives; either save the city or thy son.” Id. at 248. Creon’s beloved son is sacrificed, and 
Thebes survives. 
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C. Relational Theory and the Sacred-Value-Protection Model 
Relational theory posits when, and under what circumstances, people will 
likely experience taboo tradeoffs;78 whereas the sacred-value-protection 
(“SVP”) model theorizes the psychological consequences that people experi-
ence when confronting taboo tradeoffs.79 
First, relational theory reveals that people will likely view a tradeoff as im-
permissible when that tradeoff requires appraisal of a concept governed by one 
relational model using a different relational model.80 Relational theory posits 
that there are four models that generate or lend normative force to our social 
relationships.81 Within the social and cultural domains in which each of these 
four models operate, people can and often do make tradeoffs without cognitive 
or emotional difficulty.82 Yet when people are forced to make comparisons that 
cross these disparate models, they experience cognitive discomfort, anxiety, 
and in some cases moral outrage.83 Relational theory predicts that people will 
experience the most discomfort when attempting to monetize a concept gov-
erned by the communal-sharing model using a market-pricing scheme. The lat-
ter comparison is experienced as corrosive—felt and thought of as morally ta-
boo.84 
According to relational theory, humans harness four discrete models to 
make comparisons.85 Society at large, and localized cultures, instill members 
with beliefs about when these models apply, as well as to what, and to whom. 
In the main, people within a given society and culture share an implicit consen-
sus about when and how to implement the following four models: commu-
nal-sharing, authority-ranking, equality-matching, and market pricing.86 The 
communal-sharing model divides the world into distinct equivalence classes, 
permitting differentiation or contrast, but without numerical comparison.87 That 
is, all members of a community may share communal benefits and resources 
                                                        
78  See Alan P. Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified 
Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689, 689–93 (1992); Fiske & Tetlock, supra 
note 34, at 258–65; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–4. 
79  See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–91; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853–60. 
80  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255–65. 
81  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 144–45; McGraw 
et al., supra note 34, at 220; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59. 
82  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 265–66. 
83  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 273–81; McGraw 
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–12. 
84  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 276–77; McGraw 
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–8. 
85  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 144–45; Fiske & 
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 220; Tetlock, supra note 
76, at 458–59. 
86  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 146; Fiske & Tet-
lock, supra note 34, at 260–61; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
87  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 702–06; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw & 
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3. 
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without differentiation, including municipal parks, clean air, and national de-
fense. In the context of a communal-sharing relationship, people pool and share 
resources, which they treat as belonging to a larger whole that transcends indi-
vidual members.88 In contrast, the authority-ranking model signifies ordinal or 
hierarchical ranking among persons or social goods.89 Thus, veterans may be 
given priority access to governmental jobs, and within the military, scarce ben-
efits and resources may be doled based on rank. Another example includes hi-
erarchy, in many traditional societies, based upon familial relations across gen-
erations. The third domain is equality matching.90 This relational structure 
defines socially meaningful intervals that can be added or subtracted. For ex-
ample, if one’s neighbor offers to help another neighbor, then the expectation in 
return is that the latter neighbor will reciprocate when assistance is needed, a 
classic tit-for-tat structure. Other examples include tit-for-tat structures in co-
operatives and other social organizations. The final domain is market pricing.91 
People make decisions, using market pricing, that combine quantities of goods 
and entities into a common utility metric. For example, people often use market 
pricing to compare and contrast different goods and services using the ratio of 
quality/price or for hourly wages. The quintessential example includes market 
transactions between buyers and sellers. 
Relational theory posits that people will experience angst and constitutive 
incommensurability when forced to make tradeoffs between entities belonging 
to two different relational models.92 When two or more entities fall within the 
same relational domain, they are constitutively comparable. People, however, 
experience anxiety, discomfort, and cognitive distress when decisions require 
explicit weighing of choices among entities governed by different relational 
models.93 Further, the theory predicts that the intensity of distress depends on 
the direction and distance between the two models. Relational theory sets forth 
a continuum from left to right: from community-sharing, authority-ranking, and 
                                                        
88  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 693–700. 
89  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 700–02; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw & 
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3. 
90  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 693–700; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw & 
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3. 
91  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 706–08; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw & 
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3. 
92  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw 
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–4. Here too, Emile Durkheim eloquently discussed this hu-
man experience, 
Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the profane in 
the thought of men, and since we picture a sort of logical chasm between the two, the mind irre-
sistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be confounded, or even to be merely put 
in contact with each other; for such a promiscuity, or even too direct a contiguity, would contra-
dict too violently the dissociation of these ideas in the mind. The sacred thing is par excellence 
that which the profane should not touch, and cannot touch with impunity. 
DURKHEIM, supra note 73, at 38. 
93  See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 273–81; McGraw 
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–8. 
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equality-matching to market pricing. Crossing models from left to right on this 
continuum, especially when one engages in a comparison of a concept falling 
within the communal-sharing model using a market-pricing scheme, generates 
sharp distress. This theory predicts that people will likely experience a tradeoff 
as taboo when that tradeoff requires market pricing to compare, monetize, and 
exchange a concept that society regards as intrinsically shared by all within the 
community. 
While relational theory illuminates when, and under what conditions, peo-
ple will experience taboo tradeoffs, the sacred-value-protection model theorizes 
psychological consequences including how people will respond to taboo 
tradeoffs.94 Psychological science has demonstrated that, when observers be-
lieve that decisionmakers have struck a taboo tradeoff, observers respond with 
moral outrage.95 The research has also revealed that, after contemplating a ta-
boo tradeoff, decisionmakers often engage in moral cleansing.96 
Turning first to observers, the SVP model predicts that, when observers be-
lieve decisionmakers have entertained a proscribed tradeoff, they will respond 
with moral outrage.97 This outrage may take cognitive, affective, and behavior-
al forms. For example, observers may respond with harsh dispositional attribu-
tions toward the decisionmakers, as well as with anger, contempt, and perhaps 
disgust.98 Observers may respond with rage and attempt to enforce norms that 
protect sacred values, perhaps by punishing those who breached normative 
boundaries. Moreover, research on the SVP model has revealed that the longer 
observers believe that decisionmakers have contemplated comparing sacred 
values, the greater their moral outrage.99 
Turning next to the decisionmakers themselves, the SVP model predicts 
that even decisionmakers will feel tainted by contemplating a taboo tradeoff.100 
After the fact, decisionmakers may engage in symbolic acts of moral cleansing 
                                                        
94  See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 278–81; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–
4; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
95  This research has revealed several moderators that amplify and attenuate this moral out-
rage and moral cleansing effect. For example, there are domain moderators—the greater the 
psychometric distance between the domains, the greater the outrage. The most elevated out-
rage is reserved for transgressing the community sharing with market pricing models. More-
over, there are, at times, ideological moderators. Particular ideological groups and subcul-
tures may experience tradeoffs as more taboo than others. A capitalist—libertarian, for 
example, may see fit to reduce many communal phenomenon into market-pricing terms, 
whereas a social—Democrat would not. As well, there may be contextual moderators. It may 
be possible to amplify or attenuate outrage depending on the degree to which a tradeoff is 
directed at and threatens a core socio-political belief. 
96  See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
97  See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 453–61; Tet-
lock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
98  See generally Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88. 
99  See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59; Tet-
lock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
100  See Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
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to reaffirm their membership in and solidarity with the moral community.101 
Indeed, research has revealed that merely considering or contemplating the for-
bidden tradeoff may make a decisionmaker feel contaminated—and the longer 
the contemplation, the greater the contamination.102 
II. AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF TABOO PROCEDURAL TRADEOFFS 
A. Method 
In this program of research, we experimentally investigate how the public 
makes tradeoffs between procedural justice versus the cost of legal process. 
First, are people willing to pay to upgrade from unfair to fair process, when re-
quired to pay a small, medium, or large fee? If so, what is the public’s maxi-
mum willingness to pay to ascend from unfair to fair process? Second, and 
conversely, are people willing to accept a small, medium, or large payment to 
downgrade from fair to unfair process? If so, what is the public’s minimum 
willingness to accept to descend from procedural justice to procedural injus-
tice? The latter question raises the conundrums described above, mainly the 
problem of constitutive incommensurability and taboo tradeoffs. Finally, do 
these willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values vary with the under-
lying interests at stake? To investigate these questions, we conducted an exper-
iment with a broadly representative sample of the American public. 
1. Describing the Study 
In this empirical legal study, we presented members of the American pub-
lic with vignettes that involved legal disputes. Participants were presented with 
three different kinds of disputes: child custody, employment, and apartment 
rental disputes. 
In the child custody dispute, members of the public were placed in the role 
of a spouse, married for over ten years, worked full-time, and cared equally 
with their partner for two children. Over time, when conflicts began to escalate 
within the marriage, they attempted a trial separation. During that trial separa-
tion, they moved out of the home and into a nearby apartment but continued to 
spend equal time with the children. Their spouse ultimately filed for divorce 
and sought primary physical custody of the children. While they agreed on the 
divorce, they wished to challenge their spouse’s position on custody. 
In the employment dispute, participants were placed in the role of an em-
ployee who worked for a company for many years. One day, they began work-
ing with a coworker and noticed that the coworker stole several hundred dollars 
from a cash drawer. They confronted their coworker about it and demanded 
that their coworker return the funds, but they did not bring his conduct to the 
attention of their supervisor. About one month later, with little notice or expla-
nation, they were fired. The only reason given was that they behaved inappro-
                                                        
101  See Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59. 
102  See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–60; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59. 
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priately. They decided to challenge the decision by filing a grievance with the 
company’s human resources department, which has given them a chance to ap-
peal the decision. 
Last, in the apartment rental dispute, members of the public were placed in 
the position of a renter who signed a two-year apartment lease. One of the pro-
visions of the lease restricted them from having overnight guests. At the time of 
signing, they did not think much of the provision and believed that they would 
be able to follow it. However, their mother became desperately ill and needed 
someone to care for her. They volunteered to allow her to come and stay at 
their apartment until she returned to full health. They had forgotten about the 
provision of the lease, but a neighbor became aware of their mother’s stay and 
told their landlord. They then received an eviction notice for violating the lease 
but decided to challenge the eviction by bringing a complaint to the local land-
lord-tenant official. 
To conduct this experiment, a nationally representative sample of the 
American public was recruited, using Amazon Mechanical Turk.103 Amazon 
Mechanical Turk is widely employed in the behavioral and social sciences as a 
platform to recruit nationally representative samples of online participants.104 
The experiment was a 2 x 4 between-subject design.105 Each participant was 
randomly assigned into one condition where they, in turn, reviewed all three 
vignettes consistent with that condition. Using Qualtrics, the 400 online partici-
pants106 were assigned to one of the eight conditions depicted in Table 1. 
The first factor manipulated whether participants began with fair process 
versus unfair process. To manipulate whether participants began with fair pro-
cess or not, we drew on concepts theorized in the literature to affect perceptions 
of procedural justice, mainly whether participants were provided a voice and 
opportunity to be heard, a neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and treated 
                                                        
103  The website can be accessed at http://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome. 
104  See generally Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411–19 (2010); see also Krista Casler et al., 
Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants and Data Gathered via Amazon’s 
MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 
2156, 2156–60 (2013); Rick M. Gardner et al., Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Website to 
Measure Accuracy of Body Size Estimation and Body Dissatisfaction, 9 BODY IMAGE 532, 
532–34 (2012); John J. Horton et al., The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a 
Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399, 401–06 (2011); Winter Mason & Sid-
dharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. 
RES. METHODS 1, 1–23 (2011). 
105  For literature discussing between-subject designs, see SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH 
METHODS AND STATISTICS A CRITICAL THINKING APPROACH 152–62 (2003); S. Alexander 
Haslam & Craig McGarty, Experimental Design and Causality in Social Psychological Re-
search, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 237, 245 (Carol San-
sone et al. eds., 2004); Eliot R. Smith, Research Design, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH 
METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 27 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd 
eds., 2000). 
106  Demographic information about the sample is provided in Appendix 1, in the online sup-
plement to this article at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/. 
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TABLE 1: 2 X 4 BETWEEN-SUBJECT DESIGN 
    Factor A: WTP vs. WTA 
    
WTP: Began with Unfair Process,  
Required to Pay Fee to Upgrade 
WTA: Began with Fair Process,  
Receives Payment for Downgrade 
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l Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair 
Process & Prompt Suggested Small 
Fee 
Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to Un-
fair Process & Prompt Suggested Small 
Payment 
Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair 
Process & Prompt Suggested Medi-
um Fee 
Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to Un-
fair Process & Prompt Suggested Medi-
um Payment 
Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair 
Process & Prompt Suggested Large 
Fee 
Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to Un-
fair Process & Prompt Suggested Large 
Payment 
Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair 
Process 
Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to Un-
fair Process 
with dignity and respect.107 In the first level of this factor, participants began 
with unfair process and were then asked their willingness to pay to upgrade to a 
fair process with these features. That is, participants started in a condition that 
lacked procedural justice and were asked their maximum willingness to pay to 
upgrade to a condition in which procedural justice was present. In the second 
level of this factor, participants began with fair process and were asked their 
minimum willingness to accept to downgrade to unfair process. Here, partici-
pants began in a condition in which procedural justice was present, and then 
they were asked the minimum they would be willing to accept trade down to 
unfair procedures lacking procedural justice. 
In further detail, manipulation of this first factor began participants with a 
default procedure (Procedure A) that either withheld or afforded participants 
procedural justice. In the willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) condition for the child 
custody dispute vignette, for example, Procedure A withheld procedural justice 
from participants: 
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will not allow you to ex-
plain why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be neither polite nor 
respectful in response to your complaint. The judge will not use objective crite-
ria when deciding how to award custody and will be biased when making a deci-
sion. The judge will be untrustworthy. 
Participants were informed that Procedure A was the default option provid-
ed to them at no cost. Participants were then ultimately asked about any prefer-
                                                        
107  For the discussion of procedural justice, see supra Part I.A. 
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ence for, and their maximum willingness to pay for, Procedure B, described as 
follows: 
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will allow you to explain 
why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be polite and respectful 
during the hearing. The judge will use objective criteria in deciding how to 
award custody and will be unbiased when making a decision. Procedure B will 
require that you pay a [small/moderate/large/] fee. 
In contrast, in the WTA condition for the child custody dispute vignette, 
participants began with the following default procedure: 
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will allow you to explain 
why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be polite and respectful 
during the hearing. The judge will use objective criteria in deciding how to 
award custody and will be unbiased when making a decision. The judge will be 
trustworthy. Procedure A is the default option and is provided to you at no cost. 
Participants were then asked about any preference for, and their minimum 
willingness to accept payment for, Procedure B: 
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will not allow you to ex-
plain why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be neither polite nor 
respectful in response to your complaint. The judge will not use objective crite-
ria when deciding how to award custody and will be biased when making a deci-
sion. The judge will be untrustworthy. If you select Procedure B, the court will 
pay you a [small/moderate/large/] fee. 
As shown above, the second factor was a subtle manipulation of the sug-
gested size of the fee to be paid or payment to be received. In the WTP condi-
tion, the prompt in the last line of Procedure B suggested that participants 
would be required to pay a small, medium, or large fee for Procedure B, or left 
unspecified the nature of that fee. Conversely, in the WTA condition, the 
prompt in the last line describing Procedure B suggested that participants 
would receive a small, moderate, or large payment, or left unspecified the na-
ture of that payment. 
2. Forced-Choice Paradigm 
The first dependent variable of interest was the public’s procedural prefer-
ence. To measure these preferences, we harnessed a forced-choice paradigm. 
We asked participants to choose one of the two procedural options presented, 
either Procedure A or Procedure B. In the WTP condition, Procedure A was the 
default and entailed unfair process, whereas Procedure B entailed fair process. 
In the WTA condition, Procedure A was the default and entailed fair process, 
whereas Procedure B entailed unfair process.108 
                                                        
108  For another excellent study of procedural justice that conducts a forced-choice paradigm 
between voice and cost, see Avital Mentovich et al., My Life for a Voice: The Influence of 
Voice on Health-Care Decisions, 27 SOC. JUST. RES. 99 (2014). 
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3. Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept Framework 
The primary dependent variable of interest was the public’s willingness-to-
pay (“WTP”) and willingness-to-accept (“WTA”). This dependent variable—
WTP and WTA—is widely used in related fields of social science inquiry. For 
example, these measures are harnessed within the field of behavioral econom-
ics to examine prospect theory and endowment effects.109 Moreover, these 
measures have been used within the fields of social and moral psychology to 
examine the existence of taboo tradeoffs and tensions between sacred and secu-
lar values. This literature suggests that when WTP is roughly equivalent to 
WTA, there is no endowment effect—the allocation of the initial thing, be it a 
good, property, value, or process, does not affect whether someone is willing to 
part with it at a higher rate. When WTA value is significantly above WTP, 
however, an endowment effect has emerged. Classically, the endowment effect 
has ranged within a band of WTA two to five times greater than WTP. 
B. Results 
1. Forced-Choice Paradigm 
The forced-choice paradigm investigated the following questions: First, are 
people willing to upgrade from unfair to fair procedures, even when required to 
pay a small, moderate, or large fee? That is, when forced to do so, are people 
willing to purchase fair procedures? Second, are people willing to accept pay-
ments to downgrade from fair to unfair procedures, such as when offered a 
small, moderate, or large payment? The latter question, put bluntly, investigates 
whether people are willing to sell and exchange the procedural-justice guaran-
tees conferred to them. 
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 below: 
TABLE 2 - PERCENTAGES OF THE PUBLIC WHO CHOOSE  
FAIR PROCESS ACROSS ALL DISPUTES 
 
Small Fee /  
Payment 
Moderate Fee / 
Payment 
Large Fee /  
Payment 
WTP Condition;  
Default = Unfair Process 
99.5% 
(CI = 96.3–99.9) 
95.6% 
(CI = 91.4–97.8) 
91.8% 
(CI = 86.7–95.1) 
WTA Condition; 
Default = Fair Process 
98.3% 
(CI = 93.6–99.6) 
94.8% 
(CI = 89.5–97.5) 
85.9% 
(CI = 77.5–91.4) 
Turning first to the WTP condition, the public began with unfair process 
and was required to pay a fee to upgrade from unfair to fair process. Here, 
overwhelmingly, the public was willing to pay to upgrade to fair procedures 
                                                        
109  See generally John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Stud-
ies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). For sources 
cited in the discussion of the endowment effect and prospect theory, see infra Part II.C. 
Spring 2015] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TRADEOFFS 905
across each of the three scenarios. On average, 97.3 percent (CI = 94.5–98.6 
percent) of the public was willing to pay for procedural justice across each of 
the three scenarios (respectively, small fee = 99.47 percent, moderate fee = 
95.57 percent, and large fee = 91.8 percent). In the WTP condition, the public 
began with a default of unfair process but ultimately preferred fair process and 
was willing to pay small, moderate, and large fees to enhance procedural jus-
tice. 
FIGURE 1: THE PUBLIC’S ROBUST PREFERENCE FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
In marked contrast, in the WTA condition, the public began with a default 
of fair process and was approached with the prospect of a payment to down-
grade to unfair process. That is, the public was asked, in effect, to sell the pro-
cedural justice initially granted to them. Overwhelmingly, the public rejected 
the exchange across all three scenarios. On average, 94.9 percent (CI = 91.4–
97.0 percent) of the public rejected the payment and remained with fair process 
across each of the three scenarios110 (respective, small payment = 98.3 percent, 
medium payment = 94.8 percent, and large payment = 85.9 percent). In the 
WTA condition, the public began with a default of fair process and was unwill-
ing to part with fair process irrespective of the size of the fee signaled by the 
prompt; the public was unwilling to exchange procedural justice for money. 
                
110 Results of the forced-choice paradigm for each scenario are presented in Appendix 2, in 
the online supplement to this article at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/. See 
supra Part II.D. 
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After participants selected their procedure, we allowed them to explain 
their decisions in free-entry responses. Across these disputes, most members of 
the public explained that they would be willing to pay to ensure that they re-
ceive procedural justice. For example, in the employment dispute, a participant 
explained that she chose procedural justice because, “My job is very important 
to me. I want someone to evaluate the decision fairly and without bias. Having 
someone evaluate my case who is trustworthy and willing to hear my side is 
critical.” Another stated that she wanted “the HR department to be fair and 
honest. I want to be able to explain my side. It is better to pay to receive justice, 
than to experience injustice for free.” In the child-custody dispute, one partici-
pant stated, “Even though it’s going to be more expensive, I need to know that 
the person who is deciding a significant issue in my life will treat me and my 
case with dignity and serve my family with the time and care that we deserve.” 
Another indicated her anger over having to pay for basic justice but stated, 
“Even though I am distressed about having to pay a large fee, I feel it is worth 
it in order to get a just and fair judge who will listen to my case objectively and 
give me a shot at custody of my children. It’s too important a decision to risk in 
the hands of a judge who would not be objective.” 
In contrast, many participants expressed anger at the proposal of monetiz-
ing and selling fair procedural justice. For example, in the employment scenar-
io, a participant stated, “I think I deserve the opportunity to explain myself. 
Money seems to have been the issue in the first place and I will not allow it to 
continue the problem. Money is not worth my self-image and the value of my 
character. I know I have done little to nothing wrong and no amount of money 
will allow me to change that opinion.” Another stated, “I would rather be heard 
than paid to be mistreated.” In the child custody dispute, a participant stated, “I 
want things to be fair, no amount of money would make me want to take the 
risk I could lose custody of my kids because I took a pay off instead of asking 
for the fairest hearing.” Another stated, “No amount of money would make it 
okay for me not have a chance to explain why I should have custody of the chil-
dren.” 
2. Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept Measures 
Moreover, the WTP-WTA measures investigated the following questions: 
First, if the public is willing to pay to upgrade from unfair to fair procedures, 
what is the public’s maximum willingness to pay for fair procedures? Second, 
if the public is willing to sell fair procedures, and to thereby downgrade from 
fair to unfair procedures, what is the public’s minimum willingness to accept? 
Finally, do these WTP-WTA values vary depending on the underlying interests 
at stake? 
We collapsed across conditions on this factor to create composite means 
for the maximum willingness-to-pay and minimum willingness-to-accept con-
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ditions.111 The composite means for each of the scenarios are presented below. 
We first discuss the WTP condition, then the WTA condition, and last the full 
range of the data. 
a. Maximum Willingness-to-Pay Procedural Justice 
In the WTP condition, participants began with a default of unfair process 
and were ultimately asked the maximum they would be willing to pay to up-
grade to fair process. Figure 2 displays the composite means for WTP for each 
of the three vignettes. The mean willingness to pay to upgrade to fair process 
across all vignettes was $1,646 (CI = $1,159–$2,133). Drilling down to each 
scenario, the average willingness to pay to upgrade to fair procedures in the 
apartment rental dispute was $329 (CI = $266–$393) and in the employment 
dispute was $451 (CI = $343–$560), whereas the average WTP in the child 
custody dispute was $4,157 (CI = $2,751–$5,563). 
FIGURE 2: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (IN DOLLARS) 
                
111 See Appendix 3 in the online supplement to this article at 
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/. Given that the monetary WTP/WTA values 
were highly skewed, we first conducted a log transformation of the monetary values to per-
form statistical analyses, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING 
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 81, 308 (Allyn & Bacon eds., 2011). We then observed in the 
WTP conditions, but not the WTA conditions, a small effect relating to the factor that ma-
nipulated the subtle prompt suggesting the size of payment, Factor A (F(2,176) = 6.1, p = 
0.003) and the interaction of Factor A with Scenario (F(4,352) = 2.7, p = 0.031). Even so, 
the effect of the kind of Scenario (i.e., apartment rental, employment, versus child custody 
dispute) was vastly larger (F(2,352) = 229.11, p < 0.001). Therefore, for purposes of the 
WTP analyses presented below, see infra note 99, Factor A and its interaction with Scenario 
were included as covariates in the linear-mixed-effects model. 
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We performed a repeated-measure ANOVA to examine whether the differ-
ent underlying values at stake—child custody, employment rehiring, or apart-
ment rental—affected the public’s willingness-to-pay for fair process.112 As 
starkly illustrated, people were willing to pay a great deal more in the child cus-
tody dispute than in the apartment rental or employment condition. 
Importantly, in the WTP condition, the vast majority of participants (80 
percent) were willing to pay for fair process in all three of the scenarios (that is, 
80 percent were willing to pay for fair process in three of three scenarios). Even 
so, a fraction (12.8 percent) of participants rejected the very idea of paying for 
fair process in at least one of the three scenarios. These participants rejected our 
instruction to designate the maximum they would pay for fair process. In their 
free-entry written responses at the end of our survey, these participants ex-
pressed that fair process was a human right, one that they should not be re-
quired to pay for. 
b. Minimum Willingness-to-Accept Procedural Injustice 
In the WTA condition, participants began with fair process as the default 
and were asked the minimum that they would be willing to accept to sell fair 
process and downgrade to unfair process. Figure 3 displays the composite 
WTA means for each of the three vignettes. While the same pattern emerges as 
in Figure 2, the scales of the graphs presented for WTP and WTA differ mark-
edly, a matter to which we will return. The mean willingness to accept to de-
scend from procedural justice to procedural injustice across all vignettes was 
$487,109 (CI = $331,023–$643,196). Examining each scenario individually, 
the average willingness to accept to downgrade to procedural injustice in the 
apartment rental was $98,836 (CI = $26,041–$171,633); while the average 
WTA for the employment dispute was $160,806 (CI = $25,173–$296,441); 
whereas the average WTA in the child custody dispute was $1,201,685 (CI = 
$778,648–$1,624,722).  
Here again, we performed a repeated-measure ANOVA,113 to examine 
whether the different underlying values at stake affected the American public’s 
                                                        
112  A linear-mixed-effects model was fit in SPSS with Scenario, Factor A, and their interac-
tion as fixed effects and participant as a random effect. See generally BRADY T. WEST ET AL., 
LINEAR MIXED MODELS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE USING STATISTICAL SOFTWARE (2006). There 
were significant differences in WTP between scenarios (F(2,352) = 229.1, p < 0.001). Spe-
cifically, the amount participants were WTP in the child custody scenario was significantly 
greater than either the employment (t(352) = 17.8, p < 0.001) or apartment scenarios (t(352) 
= 19.2, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference in the amount participants were WTP 
between the apartment and employment scenarios (t(352) = 1.4, p = 0.411). As we discuss 
infra, this supports the theory that WTP-WTA values vary depending on context and the 
human interests at stake. 
113  A linear-mixed-effects model was fit in SPSS with Scenario as a fixed effect and partici-
pant as a random effect. There were significant differences in WTA between Scenarios 
(F(2,234) = 97.8 p < 0.001). Specifically, the amount participants were WTA in the child 
custody dispute scenario was significantly greater than either the employment (t(234) = 9.3, 
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minimum willingness to accept. In the child custody dispute, the minimum that 
people were willing to accept to sell fair process, and to thereby descend from 
procedural justice to injustice, eclipsed the WTA for the other scenarios. 
FIGURE 3: WILLINGNESS-TO-ACCEPT PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE (IN DOLLARS) 
Of note, while 60 percent of participants complied with our instruction to 
list their minimum willingness-to-accept value across all three scenarios, ap-
proximately 40 percent of participants rejected this instruction and refused to 
list a minimum willingness-to-accept value to downgrade to unfair process in at 
least one of three scenarios—primarily the child custody scenario—or they 
listed an astronomical sum, eclipsing hundreds of millions of dollars.114 That is, 
many participants were unwilling to sell procedural justice and to accept, in es-
sence, any amount of money to downgrade to procedural injustice. In free-entry 
written responses to our study, these participants explained that they felt selling 
procedural justice was immoral, that the experiment had asked them to engage 
in a forbidden exchange. In the employment dispute, for example, a participant 
stated, Procedure A “is fair and lets you air what you have to and they listen to 
you. Procedure B is biased and unfair . . . . No amount of money can replace an 
unbiased hearing. No matter what the outcome is.” In the child custody dispute, 
                                                                                        
p < 0.001) or apartment scenarios (t(234) = 13.6, p < 0.001). Participants’ WTA was greater 
in the employment scenario than in the apartment scenario (t(234) = 4.3, p < 0.001). 
114 For example, these participants listed a minimum willingness-to-accept exceeding one 
billion dollars. Such participants were excluded for purposes of the statistical analyses and 
treated like those participants who refused to monetize fair process when deriving the 
WTP/WTA values presented below. Several participants explained in free-entry responses 
why they selected such astronomical WTA values, “I chose a huge amount of money be-
cause I feel that there is not an amount of money for me to choose Procedure B [procedural 
injustice] for all of the situations presented in the study.” 
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a participant wrote, “Procedure A is clearly the better option. This is the fair 
and just option and the only reason I can think of a person rather having Pro-
cedure B is so they can gain financially and to me it is unthinkable that a per-
son would choose to receive a payment from the court over a fair procedure in 
determining the custody of their children.” Another stated, “No amount of mon-
ey would compare to having an unbiased judge in a situation like this. I would 
choose A no matter how much money I was paid.” 
c. Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs in Context 
FIGURE 4: TABOO PROCEDURAL TRADEOFFS IN CONTEXT 
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We depict the mean willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values in 
the same graph in Figure 4. Figure 4 exhibits both the vast difference between 
these WTP-WTA values and the extent to which these values vary with the un-
derlying interests at stake. The bottom panel presents the full range of WTP 
values on an axis that rises to $6,000, whereas the top panel presents the full 
range of WTA values on an axis that rises to $1,750,000. The top panel pre-
sents a range displaying the entire data set. As can easily be seen, the mean 
WTA values for all scenarios eclipse the axis presented in the bottom panel. 
With regard to Figure 4, several observations are in order. First, the lay 
public’s minimum willingness to accept to sell procedural justice, and to there-
by downgrade to procedural injustice, is exponentially higher than the amount 
they would be willing to pay to upgrade the status quo to fair process. Indeed, 
when compared to the public’s willingness-to-pay, the public’s willingness-to-
accept values are behemoth. That is, the public has great difficulty monetizing 
procedural justice in market-price terms and selling procedural justice. Con-
sistent with the social-psychological literature on taboo tradeoffs and relational 
theory, it appears that procedural justice is a sacred/protected value in our soci-
ety and culture. Members of the public were either unwilling to monetize and 
sell procedural fairness (again, 40 percent of participants were unwilling to do 
so in at least one of the three scenarios) and, if they were so willing, the WTA 
value exponentially escalated far beyond—eclipsed—the WTP value.  
Second, the underlying interests at stake mattered a great deal. The child 
custody context appears to present participants with a double taboo tradeoff. By 
selling fair process, participants not only lose the opportunity to be heard be-
fore a neutral decisionmaker who will treat them with dignity and respect, but 
they may ultimately lose their children. Thus, participants felt that the conun-
drum asked them to monetize both procedural justice and the significance of 
bonds with their children.115 
Third, interestingly, the standard deviations around the WTP terms were 
tighter than the standard deviations around the WTA terms. While members of 
the public appear to have a rough sense of what they would be willing to pay to 
enhance procedural fairness, people have great difficulty converging on an 
amount for which they would be willing to sell, and thereby abandon, proce-
dural fairness. This lends support to the hypothesis of constitutive incommen-
surability. In this regard, several participants noted the difficulty of monetizing 
procedural justice: “It was really difficult to put a price on changing options for 
the custody hearing, I can’t really think about putting a price on something in-
valuable like that.” Within our society and culture, people do not often explicit-
ly and with self-awareness monetize and sell the basic justice bestowed to 
them. Therefore, the WTA value is not only much higher than the WTP value, 
                                                        
115  Cf. RAZ, supra note 71, at 346–48 (“Moreover, they will be indignant at the suggestion 
that such a comparison is possible. Finally, they will refuse to contemplate even the possibil-
ity of such an exchange.”). 
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but the standard-deviation bands are much wider, revealing that the public had 
difficulty converging on a monetary range thought normative. 
C. Discussion 
We hypothesized that, consistent with social-psychological research on ta-
boo tradeoffs and relational theory, while the public may be willing to purchase 
ever-greater levels of procedural fairness, people would be either unwilling or 
sharply reluctant to commodify and sell the fundamental procedural justice af-
forded to them. 
Figure 4 reveals support for this hypothesis that this conundrum results in a 
taboo tradeoff and the problem of constitutive incommensurability. In Figure 1 
and Table 2, the study demonstrated that most members of the public were will-
ing to pay to enhance procedural justice—even when required to pay a small, 
moderate, or large fee116—though, Figure 2 revealed that the extent of the pub-
lic’s maximum WTP turned, in part, on the underlying value at stake. For ex-
ample, participants were willing to pay greater amounts for procedural justice 
in the child custody dispute than in the apartment rental or employment dispute. 
Second, Figure 1, Table 2, and Figure 4 reveal that, while the public is 
generally willing to pay for fair process, people are reluctant to sell basic pro-
tections to procedural fairness and are sharply resistant to downgrading to pro-
cedural injustice. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of participants rejected the 
conception of selling fairness in at least one of the three scenarios, especially in 
the child custody dispute. And participants who complied with our instruction 
to list the minimum they would be willing to accept to downgrade to unfair 
procedures monetized fairness at mountainously high values. As a result, the 
chasm between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept widened to 300:1. 
This 300:1 pattern is consistent with social-psychological literature on ta-
boo tradeoffs, relational theory, and the sacred-value-protection model. This 
social-psychological literature theorizes that people will experience a tradeoff 
as forbidden when that tradeoff inappropriately extends a market-pricing 
scheme into a domain normatively regulated by a communal-sharing scheme. 
Members of the public experience procedural justice as a sacred and protected 
value, one which all members of our society are entitled to share equally. That 
is, procedural justice is normatively conceived of under a communal-sharing 
scheme—as a fundamental human value or end guaranteed to all members of 
society. As a result, asking participants to quantify, monetize, and sell the jus-
tice afforded to them pursuant to a market-pricing scheme impermissibly de-
manded participants to cross relational domains. The public experienced the 
conundrum as a taboo procedural tradeoff. 
                                                        
116  These findings are consistent with another study involving a forced-choice paradigm and 
procedural justice. See Mentovich, supra note 108. 
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To be sure, prospect theory offers an alternative explanation for the WTP-
WTA differential, mainly the endowment effect.117 Behavioral economists have 
consistently revealed endowment effects—divergences between maximum 
willingness-to-pay and minimum willingness-to-accept.118 Studies on the en-
dowment effect generally manipulate whether participants begin an experiment 
with an endowment (or not) and later require participants to sell (or purchase) 
that endowment. For example, seminal studies of the endowment effect manip-
ulated whether participants began an experiment with a coffee mug (or not) and 
later asked participants their WTA to sell (or WTP to purchase) the coffee mug. 
These classic studies revealed that, because people are loss avoidant, the mini-
mum WTA values commonly rose above the maximum WTP values. Even so, 
these seminal studies revealed a WTP-WTA differential of 2:1, whereas later 
studies revealed a differential of up to 4:1.119 Given that the present study re-
veals a 300:1 differential, the endowment effect and loss avoidance cannot fully 
explain the size and magnitude of this effect. 
Moreover, participants responded with moral outrage as predicted by the 
sacred-value-protection model. When confronted with the taboo procedural 
tradeoff in the child-custody dispute, a participant wrote, for example, “I would 
prefer to have someone in authority actually listen and come to some logical 
conclusion, rather than an option where I am treated as though I might as well 
not even be there in the first place. I would feel very angry if I was to put my 
trust in a legal system that would not allow me to explain why I want custody. I 
would be angry if the court wasn’t respectful or used some objective criteria 
for their decision. I would hate to put my fate in the hands of a judge that was 
untrustworthy. All in all, it would be an incredibly bad decision to prefer 
choice B [procedural injustice] over option A [procedural justice].” Another 
participant wrote, “I would want the judge to be trustworthy and [to] treat me 
fairly so that I feel like I have a fair chance at gaining custody of my kids. If the 
judge was like Judge B [procedurally unfair] who knows what could happen? I 
                                                        
117  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 
225, 225–34 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aver-
sion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., 
Anomalies]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342–46 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Ex-
perimental Tests]; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 57, at 286–88; Jack L. Knetsch, The 
Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 
1277 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1231–42 (2003); Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psy-
chological Perspective, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 311, 311–17 (1992). 
118  See Lyle Brenner et al., On the Psychology of Loss Aversion: Possession, Valence, and 
Reversals of the Endowment Effect, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 369 (2007); Eric J. Johnson et al., 
Aspects of Endowment: A Query Theory of Value Construction, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 461, 464–71 (2007); Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 117. 
119  See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 109, at 426–33; Kahneman et al., Experimental 
Tests, supra note 117; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES 
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 168–69 (2010); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 
296 (2013). 
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could lose my kids all together and I would feel like I had no chance and was 
cheated.” Another participant wrote, “[W]hat’s the point of a court hearing if 
you can’t explain your side of the story . . . . [A] rude judge would make me feel 
like I wasn’t getting a fair deal just because of his attitude. Hard to be rude to 
someone and also truly fair to them.” Similarly, another participant wrote, “The 
selection is simple. Each litigant has a right to an impartial judge. Also, in the 
event of the case being decided in favor of my wife, I will feel less inclined to 
respect the decision if it is made in a harsh, unethical and biased manner. I 
would expect my spouse to feel the same way if the decision went against her. 
In addition, there is no benefit in taking Procedure B [procedural injustice] 
when it will only cause an already awful situation and make it even worse.” Fi-
nally, many participants felt that payment to descend from procedural fairness 
to procedural unfairness amounted to a taboo bribe; one participant wrote, 
“Procedure A [procedural justice] will allow me to explain my reasoning and 
have a fair chance. Procedure B [procedural injustice] is untrustworthy and 
seems to be just trying to buy me out for a small fee.” 
III. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This empirical legal study has illuminated how the public experiences 
tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost. Our findings demonstrate that 
the American public is willing to pay to enhance procedural fairness. Yet, the 
public is largely unwilling to sell and exchange away the basic procedural jus-
tice bestowed to them, even when approached with small, medium, or large 
payments to do so. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of participants refused to 
monetize procedural justice in at least one of the three scenarios, primarily the 
child custody dispute, refusing to designate any value that they would be will-
ing to accept to descend from procedural justice to procedural injustice.120 Fur-
ther, when members of the public designated minimum WTA values, these 
minimum WTA values far outstripped their maximum WTP values, reflecting a 
ratio of 300:1. Last, evidently context matters—these WTP-WTA values are 
not absolute or static, but rather dynamic, varying with the context and underly-
ing interests at stake. 
This striking pattern is consistent with Tetlock’s and Baron’s research on 
taboo tradeoffs and sacred values.121 As in psychological studies that examine 
taboo tradeoffs, here, many members of the public experienced procedural jus-
tice as a value possessing “transcendental significance that precludes compari-
sons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular val-
                                                        
120  As previously discussed, supra note 101, we designated participants who listed a WTA 
value over $100,000,000, like those who refused to monetize fair process. 
121  See Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Val-
uation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and 
Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 107, 122–24 (1996); Fiske & Tetlock, 
supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–4; Ritov & Baron, supra 
note 34, at 79–82; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56. 
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ues.”122 When participants were presented with proposed tradeoffs involving 
selling procedural justice, we observed strong cognitive, affective, and behav-
ioral reactance. The public sharply resisted selling procedural fairness and 
translating procedural justice into market-value terms. This pattern is also con-
sistent with the phenomenon of constitutive incommensurability and with pre-
dictions of the SVP model. The SVP model theorizes that, when the public be-
lieves that decisionmakers have contemplated fixing dollar values to sacred 
values, the public will direct moral outrage at those who contemplated taboo 
tradeoffs,123 for taboo tradeoffs undermine core assumptions central to our con-
ceptions of self and our social relationships.124  
These findings have important implications and complicate several areas of 
procedural regulation, including the cost-benefit-analysis test envisioned by 
Mathews v. Eldridge under the Due Process Clause, and new demands imposed 
on parties under newly amended Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
A. Reconceiving Procedural Regulation Under Mathews v. Eldridge 
Psychological science on taboo tradeoffs reveals the incompleteness and 
inadequacy of the cost-benefit model of procedural regulation conceived by 
Mathews v. Eldridge under the Due Process Clause.125 The present study evi-
dences that most members of the public experience procedural justice as sacred, 
an end that cannot be legitimately balanced away for money. The public expe-
riences certain forms of cost-benefit analysis of procedural safeguards as ille-
gitimate, particularly when this cost-benefit analysis is used to rationalize di-
minishing, downgrading, and denying the procedural justice furnished to 
them.126 This human psychological phenomenon complicates rigid application 
of Mathews v. Eldridge. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court wove into the Due Process 
Clause a cost-benefit standard that balances the benefit of procedural safe-
guards against their cost. Specifically, the Mathews Court called upon courts, 
when analyzing the sufficiency of legal safeguards under the Due Process 
Clause, to: first, consider the private interest affected by official action; second, 
consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the proce-
dures used; and finally, weigh the government’s interest, including the cost that 
substitute procedural safeguards would entail.127 
                                                        
122  See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853. 
123  Id. at 853–56. 
124  Id. at 853–54; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255–61; Tetlock, supra note 76, 451–
61. 
125  See Will M. Bennis et al., The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules, 5 
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 187 (2010). 
126  See id. 
127  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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Over the past several decades, Mathews v. Eldridge’s cost-benefit calculus 
has been the object of considerable ire and critique. Some have criticized 
Mathews’s cost-benefit standard as inconsistent with original jurisprudential 
understandings of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses—
for balancing as an explicit mode of constitutional interpretation did not even 
evolve until the late 1930s.128 Some have criticized the standard as unworkable 
given the incommensurability of values at stake—human life, health, and safe-
ty, for example, versus the direct cost of legal procedures.129 Relatedly, others 
have contended that the Court’s cost-benefit standard requires (and yet cloaks) 
troubling subjectivity—for judges implicitly weigh, characterize, and calculate 
costs and benefits highly subjectively, and costs and benefits vary in the eyes of 
each beholder.130 
One of the finest critiques, and in my view the most decisive, was leveled 
long ago by Professor Jerry Mashaw who charged that the Mathews Court’s 
single-minded focus on decisional accuracy neglects and conceals other hu-
manistic concerns in the pantheon of human values and experiences.131 
Mashaw eloquently argued that procedural justice, including the right to be 
heard, matter not only because voice and the opportunity to be heard “contrib-
ute to an accurate determination, but also because a lack of personal participa-
tion causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self respect that society 
properly deems independently valuable.”132 Since Mashaw, others have criti-
cized the Court’s narrow focus on decisional accuracy as excluding other hu-
man values.133 For example, Professor Charles Koch has reasoned that fairness 
                                                        
128  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 948–63 (1987). 
129  See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 
1044, 1138 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 63, 839–53. For general a discussion of this prob-
lem in law, see Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1371 (1998); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53 (1992); 
Rowell, supra note 63. 
130  See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401–22 (1981); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985) 
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (Balancing tests are “not a neutral, utilitarian calculus but an unana-
lyzed exercise of judicial will.”); see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, 
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2004). 
[T]here is no reason to think that the right answers will emerge from the strange process of as-
signing dollar values to human life, human health, and nature itself, and then crunching the 
numbers. Indeed, in pursuing this approach, formal cost-benefit analysis often hurts more than it 
helps: it muddies rather than clarifies fundamental clashes about values. 
Id. 
131  See Mashaw, supra note 5, at 39–57. 
132  See id. Kant, who famously wrote that humans as rational beings have dignity, “elevated 
above all price, and admits of no equivalent.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52–53 (1785). 
133  See e.g., Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991); 
Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 44 (1992). Some scholars 
have argued that efficiency (defined as welfare or wealth maximization) should be the pri-
mary or sole criterion in evaluating justice. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
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is a fundamental value—one neglected by the Mathews Court—as are ends 
such as legitimacy, dignity, and equality.134 Further, one of the chief difficulties 
with cost-benefit analysis is the very practice of monetizing values that society 
regards as sacred; monetizing these values interferes with them, leading us to 
think of these human ends as ordinary tastes and preferences, like those that we 
consume in the course of our everyday lives.135 In short, the underinclusive 
analysis in Mathews leaves no room for the plurality of human ends and moral 
intuitions beyond wealth-maximizing efficiency, including the sense that law 
may be unjust even if wealth maximizing.136 
These findings and psychological research on taboo tradeoffs, support 
Mashaw’s sweeping critique of the Court’s Due Process cost-benefit calculus. 
First, the public believes that the aegis of the Constitution guarantees them fun-
damental fairness and procedural justice. Second, members of the public are 
largely unwilling to sacrifice procedural justice for money. Thus, the single-
minded focus of the Mathews formulation on decisional accuracy and cost 
leaves no room to consider the public’s human concern for procedural justice 
and dignity, and the public’s psychological experience of taboo procedural 
tradeoffs. The public experiences procedural justice as sacred, not commen-
surable with the direct cost of procedures, not easily monetized, and not easily 
balanced away for money. Moreover, this empirical legal study revealed a wide 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept discrepancy. As such, any balance 
between procedural justice and cost will turn on whether a decisionmaker char-
acterizes procedural justice as a minimum default guaranteed to the American 
public, versus a contested baseline that the public must pay for.137 Lastly, by 
according no legal or analytical significance to the American public’s experi-
ence of procedural fairness, the Mathews formulation leaves no room for the 
                                                                                                                                
versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2000). In contrast, Matthew D. Adler has offered an 
account of cost-benefit analysis that incorporates intuitions about and experiences of fair-
ness. See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). 
134  See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. 
L. REV. 635 (2000). 
135  See Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION 33, 36–
40 (1981); Douglas MacLean, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Procedural Values, 16 ANALYSE & 
KRITIK 166, 171–79 (1994). 
136  Robin West powerfully elaborated the latter argument in her recent text. See ROBIN 
WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 82–84 
(2013) (discussing the effect on the law of narrow conceptions of justice, which, by focusing 
on certain evaluative criteria like efficiency and utility, neglect equally important principles 
such as human flourishing and well-being); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A 
Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); Mark Kel-
man, Choice and Utility, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 769 (1979); Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory 
and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981); Robin L. West, Authority, Autono-
my, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and 
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). 
137  See Kelman, supra note 135; MacLean, supra note 122; Kennedy, supra note 130. 
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expressive function of law,138 no door ajar for courts to express the sacred, 
symbolic, deeply human significance of procedural justice.139 
In short, the public’s experience of taboo procedural tradeoffs illuminates 
the incompleteness of Mathews v. Eldridge’s narrow cost-benefit formulation 
of the Due Process Clause—particularly when the state revokes procedural jus-
tice to avoid the cost of providing just safeguards. The Mathews v. Eldridge 
standard conceives of the “benefit” of fair process solely as enhancing deci-
sional accuracy. Yet this conception grants no conceptual or analytical weight, 
when balancing costs and benefits, to the human dignity and fairness concerns 
interwoven with the public’s experience of procedural justice. Troublingly, 
while Due Process is at its root about furnishing individuals fairness and safe-
guarding human dignity,140 these human ends are neither quantified, nor even 
qualitatively considered within Mathews v. Eldridge’s Due Process framework. 
The chasm between the Mathews Court’s single-minded focus on decision-
al accuracy and a more capacious concern for human values and experiences, 
including human dignity, is untenable and ironic. At present, courts are pre-
vented from considering human dignity and fairness under Mathews v. El-
dridge’s conception of the Due Process Clause. In marked contrast, federal 
agencies are strongly encouraged by executive order141 to “consider (and dis-
cuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including 
equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts” when engaging in 
cost-benefit analysis of regulation.142 Troublingly, courts have fallen behind 
federal agencies as the expositors of human dignity and fairness, especially 
when just safeguards are at stake. Like federal agencies, courts should aspire to 
consider, either quantitatively or qualitatively, human dignity and fairness un-
der the Due Process Clause when the state revokes procedural justice from the 
public. 
                                                        
138  See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 824. 
When evaluating a legal rule, we might ask whether the rule expresses an appropriate valuation 
of an event, person, group, or practice. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . When the Court makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the nation’s 
basic principles and commitments. This is a matter of importance quite apart from consequences, 
conventionally understood. It is customary and helpful to point to the Court’s educative effect. 
But perhaps its expressive effect, or its expressive character, better captures what is often at 
stake. 
Id. 
139  See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 792–804 (1990). 
140  See supra note 15; see generally COVER & FISS, supra note 1; DWORKIN, supra note 1; 
Fuller, supra note 1, at 372–75, 388; Hart, supra note 1, at 185; Resnik, supra note 7; Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness, supra note 1; Rawls, Legal Obligation, supra note 1. 
141  See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); see also Exec. Order No. 
13,70_, 80 Fed. Reg. __ (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“Using Behavioral Science Insights to Bet-
ter Serve the American People”). 
142  See Sunstein, supra note 14; see also Bayefsky, supra note 14. 
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Thus, we concur with Professor Gary Lawson, who has concluded that the 
Mathews formulation must be re-conceptualized, as it once was,143 as a frame-
work for structuring discussions and deliberations about fairness, rather than a 
strict, albeit underinclusive, mathematical formula. To begin, Mathews should 
not be rigidly applied as an algorithm of costs and benefits—the seeming math-
ematical precision conceals and cloaks the indeterminacy and incommensura-
bility of the human values at stake.144 Further, the Mathews framework should 
be widened to explicitly encompass considerations of human dignity, fairness, 
and the public’s experience of manifest procedural injustice. One charge 
against the Mathews cost-benefit balancing is the concern that courts strike 
procedural tradeoffs subjectively, and that political ideology affects balanc-
ing.145 In this regard, considerable psychological evidence demonstrates that 
decisionmakers implicitly adjust the costs and benefits of different alternatives 
consistent with their own anticipated affective reactions to different predicted 
consequences.146 
Psychological science offers a means of navigating beyond both the current 
calculus’s troubling subjectivity and the Mathews Court’s neglect of the pub-
lic’s experiences of procedural injustice. Not only should courts evaluate 
whether the public experiences procedural injustice, but courts should harness 
the best empirical and experimental science available to reveal how the public 
experiences different civil processes proposed. Courts and procedural regula-
tors should allow parties to proffer psychological evidence on manifest proce-
dural injustice when the minimum level of procedural safeguards is being set 
under the Due Process Clause for a particular class of disputes. In this way, 
fairness under the Due Process Clause can be re-conceptualized from an intui-
                                                        
143  See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848–49 (1977); Dixon v. Love, 
431 U.S. 105, 112–13 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977). The decision 
later acquired the air of mathematical precision. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 
18, 27 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
144  See Bennis et al., supra note 125; Kennedy, supra note 130, at 422–44; Barry Schwartz, 
The Limits of Cost-Benefit Calculation: Commentary on Bennis, Medin, & Bartels (2010), 5 
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 203 (2010); cf. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 130. 
To say that life, health, and nature are priceless is not to say that we should spend an infi-
nite amount of money to protect them. Rather, it is to say that translating life, health, and nature 
into dollars is not a fruitful way of deciding how much protection to given them. A different way 
of thinking and deciding about them is required. 
Id. 
145  See Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test: Time for a 
New Due Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 292 (2008) (stating that legal balancing scale 
should not “consist of judges’ personal views, unless constitutional law is to return to the 
‘locknerizing era’ ”); see also Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an Age of 
Relativism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363, 400 (1993) (“Balancing tests inevitably become 
intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing . . . .” (quoting 
John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975))). 
146  See generally Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotion and the Law: A Framework for Inquiry, 
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (2006). 
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tive, rationalistic (yet highly subjective) concept to one closely connected em-
pirically to the experiences of parties, claimants, and recipients of social bene-
fits affected by state action. In this way, fairness and human dignity under the 
Due Process Clause may shift from benefits that were once discounted and dis-
regarded to benefits that are appreciated, validated, and verified.147 
Psychological science can reveal whether the class of claimants most af-
fected by procedural deprivations experiences those procedural deprivations as 
manifestly unjust. In this context, the public’s experience of manifest procedur-
al injustice should be deemed of the utmost significance when resolving pro-
posed tradeoffs between fairness and cost. When psychological science demon-
strates that the public experiences injustice, a new Procedural Due Process test 
must grant these experiences of procedural injustice legal significance, con-
necting the empirical evidence, analytically to decisionmaking under the Due 
Process Clause. 
In granting analytical and legal significance to the benefits of procedural 
justice, fairness, and human dignity, there are at least three paths forward.148 To 
begin, when a claimant challenges the constitutionality of particular procedural 
safeguards, rather than conducting a strict cost-benefit analysis per se, courts 
may conduct a break-even analysis, as Cass Sunstein has elsewhere de-
scribed.149 Federal agencies conduct break-even analysis when the benefits of 
regulatory action are difficult to monetize.150 While the direct cost of substitute 
procedural safeguards can be readily appraised and valued, procedural justice 
and human dignity are exceedingly difficult to monetize. When conducting a 
break-even analysis, the crucial question would be: What would the benefits of 
the substitute procedural safeguards have to be in order to justify the costs? 
Under the break-even analysis, courts should consider the number of similarly-
situated individuals affected by state action and capaciously consider the bene-
fits of procedural justice, fairness, and human dignity to these members of the 
public. Secondly, when the state seeks to descend from procedurally just to 
procedurally unjust safeguards to save direct costs, the Mathews v. Eldridge 
cost-benefit formulation could perhaps be retained by expanding the conception 
of the “costs” of procedural injustice. In this scenario, given the deregulatory 
nature of state action, the “benefit” would be avoiding the cost or expense of 
                                                        
147  William James described this pragmatic way of discerning the truth of a concept as fol-
lows “The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those 
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can-
not.” JAMES, supra note 2, at 138. Fairness, like other concepts, can be put to the empirical 
test by drawing on procedural justice and social psychological methods. 
148  We offer these paths as plausible avenues to the destination. We leave for another day 
how one might begin to evaluate and select between them. For a discussion of similar pro-
posals in the administrative agency context, see the following excellent student note. See 
Bayefsky, supra note 14. 
149  See generally Sunstein, supra note 14; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: 
HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 65–84 (2014). 
150  See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
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just procedures, while the “cost” would be the harms flowing from procedural 
injustice. If courts absolutely must monetize the costs of injustice, courts 
should draw on WTA values, rather than WTP values, to fully capture the 
breadth of psychological and societal harms and costs. Indeed, in this scenario, 
WTA values are more normatively and morally defensible than WTP values—
all humans are endowed with human dignity.151 The relevant question would 
be: Do the proposed cost savings exceed the willingness-to-accept values of the 
population asked to descend from procedural justice to injustice? Last and per-
haps best, rather than retaining the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit standard, 
when the state’s procedural safeguards are so deficient that the public experi-
ences manifest procedural injustice, this manifest injustice should be granted 
legal significance by invoking a lexical,152 threshold rule that diminishes other 
considerations.153 Under this approach, when the population affected experi-
ences manifest injustice, the process applied should be presumed deficient and 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. 
In the decades since the Mathews Court elaborated on the cost-benefit ap-
proach under the Due Process Clause, experimental psychologists have devel-
oped the scientific means to measure and report the public’s experience of pro-
cedural injustice,154 rendering the form of introspection conducted under the 
                                                        
151  See KANT, supra note 132 (observing that human beings are endowed with dignity, a 
value that cannot be bought or replaced). Theories of justice and human dignity have been 
explored from the beginning of human civilization to the present day. See generally PLATO, 
THE REPUBLIC “Books I-V” (380 BCE); ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (350 BCE); 
CICERO, DE LEGIBUS (42 BCE); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1274), DAVID 
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL 
REASON (1788); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); ROBERT A NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
(1997); AMARTYA K. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011). 
152  John Rawls describes a lexical rule as one that 
requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the 
second before we consider the third, and so on. A principles does not come into play until those 
previous to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having to bal-
ance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with re-
spect to later ones, and hold without exception. 
RAWLS, supra note 72, at 43. In this way, one might designate the public’s experience of 
procedural injustice as a lexical rule, meaning the Court would move on to further inquiry 
only if the public does not experience manifest procedural injustice. 
153  See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 88–96 (1864). 
Is, then, the difference between the Just and the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction? 
Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy 
. . . ? By no means. . . . [A]nd no one of those who profess the most sublime contempt for the 
consequences of actions as an element in their morality, attaches more importance to the dis-
tinction than I do. . . . Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are 
vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a 
class. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
154  For an outstanding recent example of such an empirical legal study, see Shestowsky, su-
pra note 56. For additional examples, see Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ 
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Mathews formulation inexcusable. For example, the National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC) has made available excellent tools that measure the public’s 
experiences of access and fairness, tools already widely in use.155 Similar in-
struments may be adapted for considering not only experiences with court pro-
cedures, but the public’s experience with the safeguards afforded to it under the 
Due Process Clause. As Judge Burke, one of the leading proponents of proce-
dural justice reform, has aptly said, “For courts to build public trust and en-
hance the legitimacy of judicial decision making, there must be a willingness to 
commit to measuring procedural fairness.”156 
As this empirical legal study suggests, the public has marked difficulty 
trading procedural justice against cost, particularly when procedural tradeoffs 
dilute procedural fairness. Therefore, when Mathews v. Eldridge is harnessed to 
justify diminishing procedural safeguards, the public will likely perceive that 
downgrade as a taboo procedural tradeoff. In turn, the public may respond with 
moral outrage. Unfortunately, courts and procedural regulators that strike taboo 
procedural tradeoffs may attempt to avoid public outrage by concealing their 
actions from public scrutiny. Psychological literature demonstrates that, when 
the public believes that decisionmakers have struck a forbidden tradeoff, the 
public will likely respond with harsh dispositional attributions and anger. Deci-
sionmakers may, therefore, attempt to conceal or obfuscate forbidden proce-
dural tradeoffs. Decisionmakers may, for example, attempt to increase the 
opaqueness of cost-benefit analysis to conceal tradeoffs from public view. Iron-
ically, by omitting explicit consideration of procedural fairness, the Mathews 
formula itself conceals taboo procedural tradeoffs from the public. Courts and 
procedural regulators should instead acknowledge the public’s confusion, an-
ger, and angst that naturally, and sensibly, follow when the public learns of de-
cisions that involve trading procedural justice against cost. The public’s reac-
                                                                                                                                
Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empir-
ical Study, 41 CONN L. REV. 63, 74 n.46 (2008) (employing a longitudinal design to compare 
the ex ante and ex post evaluations of disputants involved in legal procedures and concluding 
that just one past study examined disputants’ ex ante evaluations); Lamont E. Stallworth & 
Linda K. Stroh, Who Is Seeking to Use ADR? Why Do They Choose to Do So?, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Jan.–Mar. 1996, at 30, 33–35 (using data from disputants with pending disputes to explore 
ex ante attitudes about procedures); see also E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: 
Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes 
Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and Arbitration, 
65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167 (1993). 
155  See CourTools, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.courtools.org (last visited Apr. 
29, 2015). As well, Nancy Welsh, Donna Stienstra, and Bobbi McAdoo have designed an 
excellent survey tool for settlement sessions, which could in theory be tailored for the Proce-
dural Due Process context. See Nancy Welsh et al., The Application of Procedural Justice 
Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING 
JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION Appendix, chp. 4 (Tania Sourdin & 
Archie Zariski eds., 2013). 
156  See Kevin S. Burke, A Vision for Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 95 
JUDICATURE 251, 253 (2012). 
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tions should not be derided as mere self-interest, bias, or resistance. Instead, we 
must encourage frank, open, and engaged deliberation between decisionmakers 
and the public, deliberation committed to crafting common solutions to our 
shared problems. We must encourage courts and procedural regulators to be-
come familiar with the public’s experiences of procedural injustice and how the 
public experiences taboo procedural tradeoffs. 
B. Exploring the Psychological Difficulties Woven Into Newly Amended Rule 1 
The phenomenon of taboo procedural tradeoffs also casts light on underap-
preciated psychological difficulties woven into newly amended Rule 1. 
Amended Rule 1 was recently approved by the Judicial Conference and the Su-
preme Court and has been conveyed to Congress for final review.157 Whereas 
Rule 1 was previously directed at judges and served largely as an interpretive 
tool to resolve ambiguity within the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, newly 
amended Rule 1 is now directed at claimants and defendants and requires them 
to experience and engage in procedural tradeoffs. As amended, Rule 1 will 
state: the rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by . . . the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion and proceeding.”158 
In amending Rule 1, the drafters sought to promote “cooperation in reduc-
ing unnecessary costs in civil litigation”159—a laudable aim. Yet conferring 
procedural justice—a neutral and trustworthy forum where claimants are fully 
granted a voice and heard, a forum in which claimants are treated with the ut-
most dignity and respect—and reducing costs to defendants and courts are in 
tension. While newly amended Rule 1 requires parties to reduce unnecessary 
costs, claimants and defendants will doubtless disagree on whether costs ex-
pended to promote procedural fairness are necessary.160 For example, our find-
ings reveal that claimants will likely experience as taboo the practice of sacri-
ficing procedural justice to save the cost borne on defendants and courts. When 
these competing dynamics are present, newly amended Rule 1 may compel 
claimants to experience and strike tradeoffs that violate normative beliefs about 
the value of justice. Forcing the public to engage in this cost-benefit logic may 
                                                        
157  See Memorandum and Letter of Transmittal, supra note 9. 
158  Id. at B-21 (emphasis added). 
159  The drafters contextualized the rule, stating: “[t]his change should be combined with 
continuing efforts to educate litigants and courts on the importance of cooperation in reduc-
ing unnecessary costs in civil litigation.” Id. at B-13. This commentary reveals an implicit 
connection between the efficiency rationale and cost reduction, a seemingly synonymous 
nature between the two. Brooke D. Coleman has recently referred to this implicit contiguity 
between these two concepts as the efficiency norm in civil procedure. See Brooke D. Cole-
man, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2015). 
160  See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bar-
gaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than 
Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985); Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of 
Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010). 
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result in moral outrage, reducing satisfaction with federal adjudication and po-
tentially diminishing our civil justice system’s perceived legitimacy. 
Further, clients and lawyers hold different perspectives about civil pro-
cess.161 Socio-legal scholars have theorized that lawyers and their clients com-
prise different legal cultures, which fundamentally shape beliefs and values 
about the legal process.162 Insofar as courts, lawyers, and members of the pub-
lic experience the tradeoffs envisioned in Rule 1 differently, these different ex-
periences underscore epistemological tension inherent within newly amended 
Rule 1. Which logic-in-use should be privileged? Put differently, how one ex-
periences monetizing procedural justice will likely turn on one’s distinct legal 
culture. 
To be sure, lawyers are gatekeepers who channel the public through our 
civil justice, while shaping client perceptions and behaviors.163 Here, the 
Committee Note appears to be directed at lawyers: “Effective advocacy is con-
sistent with—and indeed depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of 
procedure.”164 While cooperation is doubtless admirable, if by cooperation, at-
torneys will be tasked with explaining to claimants why they must sacrifice 
their client’s voice to reduce the system-wide cost of litigation, this form of 
promoting cooperation to reduce cost is wrought with psychological difficulty. 
Further, courts must tread with caution in applying newly amended Rule 1 to 
unrepresented litigants because pro se litigants are even more likely to experi-
ence Rule 1 as requiring taboo procedural tradeoffs. 
Newly amended Rule 1 is animated by an implicit normative behavioral 
theory165 of how parties should navigate the civil justice system (procedural 
fairness, except when costly), which may fail as a descriptive behavioral theory 
of how parties in fact experience the civil justice system, especially when the 
competing ends of procedural fairness and efficiency are in tension. Federal 
courts must proceed with caution when applying newly amended Rule 1. Ro-
bust, rigid application of amended Rule 1 will fail the test of behavioral real-
ism166 and likely dampen the perceived legitimacy of federal adjudication. 
                                                        
161  See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: 
POWER & MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 5 (1995); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, 
Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 737 (1988); see also Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in 
Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 (1987). 
162  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1998); Law-
rence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and the Welfare State, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE 
WELFARE STATE 13, 17 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988). 
163  See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 161. 
164  See Memorandum, supra note 9, at B-13. 
165  See generally Krieger & Fiske, supra note 27. 
166  See id. 
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C. Reinvigorating Civil Procedure Pedagogy 
Beyond offering insight into both courts and procedural regulators, law and 
psychological science research holds immense pedagogical value.167 First and 
foremost, psychological science on social cognition, judgment and deci-
sionmaking, emotion, attitudes and persuasion, memory, social influence, cog-
nitive-dissonance, prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, social justice, and 
procedural justice168—and the scientific method harnessed to amass these pow-
erful psychological insights—holds the promise of improving how we teach le-
gal subject matter, including civil procedure. Indeed, as John Dewey sagely 
wrote in Experience and Education, 
[I]t is a sound educational principle that students should be introduced to scien-
tific subject-matter and be initiated into its facts and laws through acquaintance 
with everyday social applications. . . . [I]t is impossible to obtain an understand-
ing of present social forces (without which they cannot be mastered and di-
rected) apart from an education which leads learners into knowledge of the very 
same facts and principles which in their final organization constitute the scienc-
es.169 
Dewey later concludes, 
I see at bottom but two alternatives between which education must choose if it is 
not to drift aimlessly. One of them is expressed by the attempt to induce educa-
tors to return to the intellectual methods and ideals that arose centuries before 
scientific method was developed. . . . [I]t is so out of touch with all the condi-
tions of modern life that I believe it is folly to seek salvation in that direction. 
The other alternative is systematic utilization of scientific method as the pattern 
and ideal of intelligent exploration and exploitation of the potentialities inherent 
in experience.170 
In the main, we can improve legal pedagogy by weaving the mind sciences, 
including powerful psychological insights, into our curricula and by teaching 
our law students the scientific and experimental method. 
From one perspective, students are exposed early on in law school to both 
the importance of a fair process when resolving disputes and basic fairness, as 
both a moral and legal necessity applied to a wide range of legal procedures.171 
                                                        
167  See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: 
Insights for Legal Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 366 (2015) (“Psychology—the science 
of how people think, feel, and behave—has a great deal to teach about a range of core com-
petencies related to working with people and making good decisions. . . . Despite the im-
portance of interpersonal aspects of lawyering and the utility of psychology for mastering . . . 
the profession, law school curricula include relatively little psychology.” (footnote omitted)). 
168  For an outstanding and timely example on how to weave these social-psychological con-
cepts into the legal curriculum, see JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, 
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012); Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167. 
169  JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS 1925–1953, at 53–54 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988). 
170  Id. at 58. 
171  See WEST, supra note 136, at 48. Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik have harnessed moral 
values as a guide to their pedagogy and scholarship. See OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, 
ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE (2003); see also 
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Too often, however, civil procedure scholars do not teach law students about 
the competing ends and tradeoffs inherent within the rules of procedure and our 
civil justice system.172 When civil procedure scholars do, we may inadvertently 
normalize the form of underinclusive cost-benefit analysis articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge. With the sea change increase in binding consumer arbi-
tration, we must also guard against normalizing the tradeoffs struck when pro-
cedural justice is lost upon binding arbitration clauses buried in consumer con-
tracts. 
When law students first learn about legal process, many have marked diffi-
culty grasping cost-benefit analysis—particularly when cost-benefit analysis is 
used to legitimize diminishing procedural safeguards without considering the 
benefits of procedural justice, and even more so when cost-benefit analysis is 
used to justify legal process that feels manifestly unjust. This research suggests 
that this difficulty may be, in part, attributable to different legal cultures of 
knowledge: internal (the legal culture of lawyers and judges) and external (the 
legal culture of the population at large).173 Before socialization in the legal 
academy, law students may experience fair process and procedural justice as 
sacred, of transcendental and infinite significance. Civil procedure pedagogy 
may socialize law students to reconceive of legal process in more instrumental, 
consequential, and perhaps even market-price terms. Yet, when law students 
enter the academy, many likely conceive of procedural justice, and other con-
ceptions of justice, in more humanistic terms. 
As teachers of civil procedure, we should recall that, when law students en-
ter the academy, they enter from a different legal culture with a different per-
spective. The sacred-value-protection model suggests that different cultures 
will classify different values as sacred. While our internal legal culture may 
monetize legal procedures into secular terms,174 external legal culture, includ-
                                                                                                                                
COVER, FISS & RESNIK, supra note 7; Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2219 (1989). 
172  Professor Morrison has eloquently written about this deficiency. See Morrison, supra 
note 7. Robert Cover and Owen Fiss discussed competing aims of the civil justice system 
and related tradeoffs in their excellent work, which explored themes of meta-procedure. See 
COVER & FISS, supra note 1. 
173  See Friedman, supra note 162. 
The legal system, in short, is a ship that sails the seas of social force. And the concept of 
legal culture is crucial to an understanding of legal development. By legal culture, we mean the 
ideas, attitudes, values, and beliefs that people hold about the legal system. . . . One should also 
distinguish between internal legal culture . . . and external. 
Id. 
174  See Marc Galanter, Notes on the Future of Social Research in Law, in LAW & SOCIETY: 
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 25, 25–26 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995). 
Legal scholars and professionals, while accentuating various differences with one another, dis-
play a broad agreement about the nature of legal phenomena. I refer [to] adherence, usually tacit 
to a set of propositions which, taken together, provide a cognitive map or paradigm of legal real-
ity. . . . The rules (authoritative normative learning) represent (reflects, expresses, embodies, re-
fines) general (widely-shared, dominant) social preferences (values, norms, interests). 
Id. 
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ing the public and fledgling law students entering the academy, hold more hu-
manistic intuitions about procedural fairness and procedural justice. 
As such, we must teach the tension and thorns associated with monetizing 
fair process. To be sure, the public, and many of the clients that law students 
will eventually serve, may experience the same difficulty that law students 
themselves once faced. Drawing on the best research available within the mind 
sciences, we should teach students about the underlying psychology and the af-
fective processes that occur when disputants experience these tradeoffs, the dif-
ficulties that decisionmakers experience when striking taboo procedural 
tradeoffs, and about procedural justice.175 Finally, I concur with Professor Jean 
R. Sternlight and Jennifer K. Robbennolt, who recently concluded that civil 
procedure courses would be enhanced by teaching about the “the psychology 
relating to perception, justice, discovery, persuasion, or negotiation in order to 
help students consider how to evaluate claims and defenses, how best to resolve 
clients’ disputes, or how to present arguments most effectively.”176 
CONCLUSION 
Having discussed the findings of this first phase of the research line, and 
having thereby begun to illuminate how the public perceives taboo procedural 
tradeoffs, we now discuss limitations and next steps. 
First, we manipulated procedural justice by simultaneously varying voice 
and opportunity to be heard, a neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and be-
ing treated with dignity and respect. Nonetheless, the public may experience 
these distinct components of procedural justice differently. Moreover, although 
these concepts were simultaneously manipulated to provide an unfair procedur-
al option, altering one of these concepts at a time, or several of these concepts 
together rather than all at once, may influence the public’s WTP and WTA val-
ues. Further studies will explore the possibility that fewer than all of these con-
structs can together form either fair process or unfair process and affect the 
WTP and WTA values. 
Second, we conducted this program of research with members of the 
American lay public, which is largely comprised of one-shot litigation players, 
rather than repeat players.177 Research, however, suggests that repeat players, 
such as lenders, liability insurers, and general counsel who handle numerous 
disputes across many different forums with many different procedures, may 
experience tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost in economic and bu-
reaucratic-processing terms.178 Indeed, repeat players may be willing to pay 
                                                        
175  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 32; Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167, at 382. 
176  See Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167, at 382. 
177  See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–108 (1974). 
178  See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970). 
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more for procedural justice than one-shot players in strategically selected cases, 
given the cascading effect of procedures across many of the disputes they initi-
ate or defend.179 At the same time, repeat players may be willing to accept far 
less than the lay public to sell off procedural justice, as repeat players may 
more readily conceive of procedures in secular and economic terms. This dis-
tinction between one-shot players and repeat players warrants further empirical 
inquiry. 
Third, this particular study used self-report measures and participants’ free-
written responses. While participants wrote charged emotional statements in 
their free-responses questions, in the future, we plan to employ more precise 
psycho-physiological devices to measure the angst and outrage that the public 
experiences. This is an additional direction of the present research study. 
Finally, with regard to method, in this phase of the research, we employed 
experimentally-manipulated vignettes. While experiments that harness vi-
gnettes have high internal validity, these vignette studies may lack in external 
validity. In the future, we aim to bridge from lab studies to field studies. 
In closing, while fairness is a foundational concept, debate surrounds how 
best to reconcile the competing ends of our civil justice system. In this article, 
we have drawn on psychological science and experimental methods to examine 
how members of the public experience tradeoffs between procedural justice and 
cost. Our empirical legal study revealed, first, that the public is willing to pay 
to upgrade from procedural unfairness to procedural fairness. The empirical le-
gal study, however, revealed that the lay public largely rejects accepting money 
to downgrade from procedural justice to procedural injustice—the public is 
largely unwilling to sell the fundamental justice afforded to them and unwilling 
to accept money for procedural injustice.180 While we found that willingness-
to-pay and willingness-to-accept values varied with the underlying interest at 
stake, our study ultimately found that when members of the public designated 
minimum WTA values, these minimum WTA values eclipsed related maxi-
mum WTP values. In this way, we have revealed that the public experiences 
                                                                                                                                
In order to process successfully vast numbers of cases, organizations tend to take on the 
characteristics of “bureaucracy” in the sociological sense of the term . . . . Such an organization-
al form produces competence and efficiency in applying general rules to particular cases, but it 
is not well suited to making complex and individualized decisions. 
Id. at 237; Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, He-
gemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, in 11 STUDIES IN LAW, 
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 95, 95–117 (1991). 
179  See Welsh et al., supra note 155, at 68–69 (“The assessments of judges, lawyers, and 
other repeat players make of outcome fairness . . . are influenced more by their expectations 
of the outcomes they should receive than by their perceptions of procedural justice.”); see 
also JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH 
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 83 (1983) (finding repeat players who made extensive use of 
the court-connected arbitration program appeared to care little about “qualitative aspects of 
the hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it deliv-
ers”). 
180  See supra Part II. 
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the psychological phenomenon of taboo procedural tradeoffs. In the main, the 
public will experience a taboo procedural tradeoff when the procedural justice 
furnished to the public descends to procedural injustice, and when this descent 
is rationalized as avoiding monetary costs. 
As John Stuart Mill sagely observed in the final words of his magnum 
opus, 
Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly 
more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are 
as a class . . . and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded 
by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from 
the milder feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure 
or convenience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the 
sterner character of its sanctions.181 
The public experiences the secular value of money and the sacred end of justice 
as incommensurable.  For our civil justice system to be experienced as legiti-
mate, we must not sacrifice and exchange the procedural justice bestowed on 
the American public for manifest procedural injustice to save direct costs. 
                                                        
181  MILL, supra note 153, at 96. 
